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vFORMAL SPECIFICATION LANGAUGE FOR VEHICULAR AD-HOC
NETWORK
Abstract
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a form of Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (wireless
Network), originally used to provide safety & comfort for passengers, & currently being
used to establish Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) among near by
Vehicles (V2V Communications) and between vehicles and nearby fixed infrastructure
equipments; Roadside equipments (V2I Communications). VANET was used also to
warn drivers of collision possibilities, road sign alarms, auto-payment at road tolls and
parks. Usually VANET can be found in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).
VANET is the current and near future hot topic for research, that has been
targeted by many researchers to develop some applications and protocols specifically for
the VANET. But a problem facing all VANET researchers is the unavailability of a
formal specification language to specify the VANET systems, protocols, applications and
scenarios proposed by those researchers.
A specification language is a formal language that is used during the systems
design, analysis, and requirements analysis. Using a formal specification language, a
researcher can show “What his system does”, Not How.
As a contribution of our research we have created a formal specification language
for VANET. We made the use of some Romans characters & some basic symbols to
represent VANET Systems & Applications. In addition, we have created some combined
symbols to represent actions and operations of the VANET system and its participating
devices. Our formal specification language covers many of the VANET aspects, and
offers Validity Test and Consistency Test for the systems.
Using our specification language, we have presented three different case studies
based on a VANET system model we have created and put them into the system validity
and consistency tests and showed how to describe a VANET system and its applications
using our formal specification language.
vFORMAL SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE FOR VEHICULAR AD-HOC
NETWORK
ABSTRAK
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) terhasil dari Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (wireless
Network), pada dasarnya digunakan untuk penyediaan keselamatan dan keselesaan
kepada penunggang, dan pada masa kini ia dipertingkatkan dengan penggunaan
komunikasi jarak dekat (DSRC) di antara kenderaan-kenderaan (V2V Communications)
dan infrastruktur yang berhampiran; kemudahan di tepi jalan((V2I Communications).
VANET juga digunakan untuk memberi amaran kepada pemandu tentang kemungkinan
berlakunya perlanggaran, amaran tanda jalan, pembayaran automatik di tol dan di tempat
meletakkankan kenderaan. Selalunya VANET boleh didapati di ITS (intelligent
transportation Systems).
VANET adalah merupakan topik yang ‘panas’ pada masa kini dalam penyelidikan
dan ia menjadi sasaran kepada penyelidik untuk memperkembangkan beberapa aplikasi
dan protokol khususnya dalam VANET. Tetapi masalah yang dihadapi oleh penyelidik
VANET adalah ketidakmampuan bahasa rasmi yang khusus untuk pengkhususan sistem
VANET, protokol, aplikasi dan senario yang diusulkan oleh penyelidik-penyelidik.
Bahasa khusus adalah bahasa rasmi yang digunakan semasa merekacipta sistem,
analisis, dan keperluan analisis. Penggunaan bahasa rasmi yang khusus, penyelidik boleh
mempamerkan apa yang sistem itu hasilkan, bukannya bagaimana ia dihasilkan.
Sebagai penyumbang kepada penyelidikan, kami telah menghasilkan bahasa
rasmi yang khusus untuk VANET. Kami menggunakan beberapa karakter Romans dan
beberapa simbol asas untuk dipersembahkan kepada sistem VANET dan aplikasi.
Tambahan pula, kami telah menghasilkan beberapa kombinasi simbol untuk aksi terkini
dan operasi sistem VANET serta alat-alat yang terlibat dengannya. Bahasa rasmi khusus
kami meliputi banyak aspek VANET dan menawarkan Ujian Pengesahan and Ujian
Konsistensi untuk sistem.
Dengan menggunakan bahasa khusus kami, kami telah membentangkan tiga
perbezaan kajian kes berdasarkan dari model sistem VANET yang telah terhasil dan
vi
diletakkan ke dalam pengesahan sistem dan ujian konsistensi serta mempamerkan
bagaimana untuk menggambarkan sistem VANET dan aplikasinya menggunakan bahasa
rasmi yang khusus dihasilkan oleh kami.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 VANET
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a form of Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (wireless
Network), originally used to provide safety & comfort for vehicle users. Currently it is
being used to establish a dedicated short range of communication (DSRC) among nearby
Vehicles (V2V Communications) and between vehicles and nearby fixed infrastructure
equipment; Roadside equipment (V2I Communications). VANET is also used to warn
drivers from any collision possibilities, road sign alarms, auto-payment at road tolls and
parks. VANET can be usually found at Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).[
SCHROTH C., 2006].
The VANET works ideally in an integrated environment which is shown in Figure
1.1.[COPS M., 2006].
Figure 1.1: VANET Integrated Infrastructure
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Ad-hoc Networks do not use centralized administration, and do not rely on any
pre-established infrastructure; its nodes rely on each other to keep the network connected.
Although, VANET is not a pure Ad hoc Network since it does rely on a fixed
infrastructure when a V2I communication happens, it uses the DSRC technology to
connect the vehicles with the existing infrastructure.
1.2 DSRC
5.9 GHz DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) is a short to medium range
communication service that supports both Public Safety and Private operations from
roadside to vehicle and from one vehicle to another vehicles communication
environment. DSRC is meant to be a complement to cellular communication by
providing very high data transfer rates in circumstances where, minimizing latency in the
communication link and isolating relatively small communication zones are
important.[LEEARMSTRONG, 2008]
DSRC is a short range radio created to serve as a transportation specific
technology. It can provide a half duplex connection between the participating nodes with
a high bit rate of (6 Mbps) up to (27 Mbps) and a coverage area radius of up to 1000m.
IEEE 802.11p will be based on the standard IEEE 1609 which is a higher layer standard
it is also used as the groundwork for DSRC which defines enhancement to 802.11 which
requires supporting ITS Applications. 802.11p project still in progress and the approved
802.11p amendment is scheduled to be published on December 2007.[IEEE GROUPER,
2008]
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1.3 VANET Characteristics
The features of a vehicular ad hoc network are totally different compared to other mobile
ad hoc networks. The unique properties of a VANET has pushed the researchers to make
use of these characteristics to increase network performance. At the same time it can be
considered as challenges. A VANET is fundamentally different [BALON N., (2006)]
from other MANETs:
1. The VANET coverage area diameter is relatively small compared to other
types.
2. Disintegration of the network into smaller segments often occurs. The reason
behind the short life for the link in a VANET is because of the high speed
mobility of the vehicles which might reach up to 200 km/h. In order to
lengthen the life time of a link, we should increase the transmission power of
the vehicles antennas, which on the other hand will decrease the throughput of
the network.
3. A VANET rapidly changes into some predictable topology, because vehicle
movements are limited by the road itself. The high mobility of vehicles cause
the topology to change frequently and due to that the existence time of a
communication link between two vehicles is short.
4. A VANET sparks up many unique security challenges.
5. Since VANET is using DSRC technology, it has low transmission latency,
about 50ms when the vehicle’s speed is at 120 Km/h.
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1.4 VANET Communication promises
VANET communication promises a lot of services and easiness for the drivers, these
promises resides within the following:
1- VANET promises safer roads
2- VANET promises more efficient driving
3- VANET promises more fun driving
4- VANET promises easier maintenance of the vehicles
1.5 DSRC – VANET Applications
Many researches were done to create applications based on the usage of DSRC. The




• Routing Based applications.
Each of the above four application categories can be further categorized into safety and
non-safety applications.
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1.6 VANET Applications
There are many applications and others are still to be created for the Vehicular networks
to satisfy all the VANET promises. These applications are categorized into:
1- E-safety applications
(e.g.; turn left assistant, urgent situation vehicle approaching warning, vehicle
safety examination, stolen vehicles tracing, rail accident warning, etc.)
2- Traffic management applications
(e.g.; Highway merges assistant, electronic toll payment, hazardous material
shipment, etc.)
3- Enhanced driver comfort
(e.g.; Download or update road maps, instant messaging between vehicles, hot
spot notification, parking spot locator, etc.)
4- Maintenance
(e.g.; notice on safety recall, just in time repair notification, etc.)
1.7 Formal Specification Language
Formal Specification is a strict description of a system, describing the details needed by
the system to perform its job properly. The formal specification language is the set of
notations and rules used to write the formal specification for the system.
The main use of the formal specification language is to describe any system
mathematically and then apply different scenarios on it to reveal any inconsistency,
incompleteness, or ambiguity in the system’s operation.
Formal methods are still hard to scale up for large systems. So the system is
disintegrated into smaller sub-systems which interact with each other through interfaces
to do the main system’s job. The layer VANET Model has many devices which work
individually. Each of them has its own interfaces to interact with other devices around.
Each device is considered as the sub-systems.
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Figure 1.2 shows a system which has been decomposed into three smaller Sub-
Systems, A, B, and C. Each Sub-System has at least one interface which interacts with
the surrounding Sub-Systems. The interface has two functions that control its operation,
those are; MtC (Message Type Checker) and Pfr (Packet forwarder). The function of MtC
is to be responsible for the incoming data stream whereas the Pfr is responsible for the
outgoing data. For more details about both of MtC and Pfr, refer to chapter 3.
Figure 1.2: Interface Objects
The scopes of the formal methods are limited. They are not well suited to specify
and analysis use interface and user interaction. However, our language does solve the
user interaction problem as we will see later on this report.
The major benefits of formal methods are in reducing the number of faults in the
systems. As a result, critical systems engineering is the main spot of formal methods
applicability. The usage of formal methods is presumably cost-effective because high
system failure costs can be avoided.
The main benefits of using the formal specification are; it obliges a






MtC: Message Type Checker
Pfr: Packet Forwarder
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 7
can be discovered and resolved. It is true that there are larger costs to be spent up front
and efforts are exhausted in developing the specification for a system. However,
implementation and validation costs must be compacted as the specification process
reduces errors and vagueness in the requirements.
1.8 Problem Statement
Three problems we have specified and we are going to focus on in this thesis,
those are:
1- There is no common formal specification language for VANET researchers to
use so they specify their systems.
2- There is no Mini Model of VANET Environment to be used by researchers as
part of their test bed.
3- There is no suggested scheme to control and located vehicles remotely via
VANET.
1.9 Objective of the Study
The main objective is creating a formal specification language that can be used for
describing VANET aspects theoretically and specify by proving VANET’s System and
their applications. The second objective is creating a layered system that can be used to
model VANET environment for case studies scenarios. Finally outline an application
layer protocol on a layered system to deliver services to and access the remote mobile
nodes.
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1.10 Motivation
Car manufacturers are about to take a quantum leap in terms of enhancing driving safety
but they are waiting for new technologies and applications to be created and be
experimented before they could use with their products. Our proposed model of layered
VANET system and the Application layer protocol can be an important as well as a
unique part of that future leap. In the meantime, our proposed VANET specification
language can be used by those going for work during that future period of time on related
researches to present and prove the consistency and the completeness of their ideas and
theories to reveal an ambiguity, incompleteness and inconsistency in them.
The main incentive behind creating a formal specification language and the layered
model system for VANET environment is needed by the researchers who are going to
work on VANET area during the future leap. Hence the inducement after lining out the
application layer protocol is to draw a starter line for creating a common protocol which
can be used on VANET environment and also to create more applications based on the
protocol.
1.11 VANET challenges
VANET challenges can be listed as:
1- Devices Communication efficiency with High Mobility
2- Packet Delivery ratio
3- Routing reliability – Dynamically changing network Topology map
4- Dead-lock management
5- High traffic management
6- Participated devices Coverage Area & Energy
7- Communication Events Synchronization
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1.12 Scope of the Study
VANET has many aspects that need to be plunged into and also to find the solutions. In
order to do so, we need to have a specification language to describe the solutions.
VANET aspects can be listed as:




a. Authentication & key management
b. Privacy
c. Trust & Revocation
d. Secure positioning
5- Messages Delivery/exchanging
6- Environment description (Nodes positions, environment limitations, …etc)
7- Data Dissemination
8- Routing
Our proposed specification language covered many of the VANET aspects (listed
above) except some such as routing and security (Only the simple Authentication & key
management have been covered).
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Each layer has its own features and devices to operate at. Our proposed system
hires 25 different messages to implement its functions. (See Chapter-3)
1.13 Case Studies
We have implemented three case studies (See Chapter-4) in our system to show its
abilities and at the same time, we highlighted that they would be specified using our
specification language. These case studies are listed:
- Vehicles Speed control on highway
- Stolen car locating & remotely stop it.
- Fast ending for police car chasing.
1.14 Thesis Layout
This report consists of 6 chapters, the first two chapters explain some general concepts of
VANET and Formal Specification Languages, and also tell the state of the art. Chapter 3
describes our methodology to design the proposed layered system Model and the
application of layered protocol and illustrates our proposed specification language and
how to make use of it. Chapter 4 describes mathematically (using our proposed
specification language shown in chapter 3) three case studies. Chapter 5 discusses the
validity and the consistency test for the three case studies and depicts three comparisons
between our formal specification language and other languages. Chapter 6 concludes the
whole report and indicates what hereafter work can be done.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
2.1 Literature Review
With the latest inventions in wireless technologies, automobile manufacturers are about
to take an enormous step to enhance the driving safety and comfort by allowing vehicles
to talk with each other along with the roadside equipment infrastructure explicitly
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks or VANET[FARKAS C. 2007]. In order that, many projects
are in progress aiming for more safe highways.
2.1.1 Services through VANET
A project was conducted (September 2007) by three computer scientists at University of
South Carolina, The title of the project was: “Application Level Protocol for Accident
reconstruction in VANETs”, which was aiming to investigate the possibilities of
leveraging inter-vehicle communications within VANET framework. This is to analyze
the crash data for accurate accident reconstruction, collecting data after an accident
happens, which will help in solving out the problem but not saving the lives. The
National science Foundation in South Carolina (NFS) sponsored the project which costs
about $838,000 [FARKAS C. 2007].
Two French motorway companies; SAFESPOT and CVIS (Cooperative Vehicle-
Infrastructure Systems) with different participants of the ITS business are involved in
projects related to infrastructure/vehicle communication. SAFESPOT had started in
February 2006 to develop a project which was mainly aimed to understand and assess,
trough test in real condition. It was also to identify the potential of the cooperative
approach in terms of transport safety improvement, which had addressed 12 problems
that can be solved through this project. This project has cost about € 38 Million and is
expected to be completed in four years time. Moreover, about 51 partners from 12
different European countries had supported this project.[FREMONT G., 2007]
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The CVIS had started a project in February 2006. FP6 Integrated Project was
aimed to develop and experiment new technologies which allowed road vehicles to
communicate with other roadside infrastructure. Based on real-time road and traffic
information, many novel applications can be produced. The consequence will increase
road safety and efficiency, and reduce the environmental impact. Sixty-one partners from
12 countries had cooperated to work and sponsor this project which costed about € 41
Million. They had planned to finish it within 4 years time. [FREMONT G., 2007]
In [SONG H., 2008], some researchers have proposed a sensor-network-based
security system for vehicles. This would detect unauthenticated movement and keep track
of the stolen vehicles while alarming a near by base station by sending warning messages
to the security office at that parking lot. However, it has some limitations especially with
the extreme case of the none-existence of neighbors although a sensor has tried its
maximum level of power.
2.1.2 Data Dissemination
In [BAUMANN R., 2004], a research project was done in 2004 titled as: “Engineering
and simulation of mobile ad-hoc routing protocols for VANET on highways and in
cities”, which was aiming at creating two new broadcasting mechanisms for VANET
networks. It was suggested to minimize the number of broadcasting messages and to get
more stable routes: the Secure Ring Broadcasting (SRB) and the Directed Route Node
Selection (DRNS). This will help to speed up the communication within VANET
environment.
Also there was a master’s project aiming to improve the broadcasting in VANET
Environment, which was done in 2006 at University of Michigan, “Increasing Broadcast
Reliability in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks”. Basically they proposed a new technique to
improve the reception rate of broadcast messages by a dynamic adjustment for the
contention window size done by the VANET nodes. The size of adjustment is based on
the number of successfully received packets per the last few seconds.[BALON N.,
(2006)]
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There were many researches done on Information Dissemination within VANET
environment. Some of them were very beneficial and successful, while others were not
studied in detail. An example of Information Dissemination project is; “Optimizing
Dissemination of Alarm Messages in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANET)”; which
was done in 2004 at the University of Avignon – France. In that project, mainly they
proposed a scheme for alarm messages dissemination of accidents to warn other vehicles
about the accident in a more efficient way by restricting rebroadcast to only special
nodes, named “relays”.[ABDERRAHIM B., 2004]
2.1.3 VANET Modeling & Simulation
In [SOMMER C., et.al, 2008], some researchers have created an integrated tool for
graphical modeling. A bidirectional coupling of network simulation, road traffic micro
simulation, and also a comprehensive library that can be used for communication
networks (using OMNET++ simulator).
2.1.4 VANET Communication Enhancement
Vehicular networks are highly mobile and often disconnected therefore the multi-hop
data delivery in VANET environment is so complex. Hence many researchers targeted
this complexity to solve and find efficient suggestions to jump over those complexities.
In [ZHAO J., 2006], a group of researchers proposed a bunch of data delivery protocols
which are outperforming the existing solutions (at that time) in terms of packet delivery
ratio, data packet delay, and protocol overhead.
Due to the vehicle’s high speed and the limitation of the access point’s coverage
area, getting an IP address from a DHCP (Dynamic Host configuration Protocol) might
not be guaranteed. This might consume up to 100 percent of the vehicle’s available
connection time. So In [ARNOLD T., 2008], an IP address passing protocol was
suggested to reduce the overhead of obtaining an IP address to under one-tenth of a
second (Without modifying either DHCP or Address Passing (AP) software).
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In [BYCHKOVSKY V., 2006], a group of researchers targeting the Internet
access service from vehicles, tried to prove that unplanned network service can provide
reasonable performance to network clients moving in vehicles at vehicular speeds.
Finally they found some measurement results which can improve transport protocols in
VANET networks.
In [ZHAO J., 2008], a scheme was proposed to extend the service range of
roadside access points, which allow drive-thru vehicles to maintain high throughput
within an extended coverage range, by using a vehicle-to-vehicle reply scheme.
From the personal point of view, Vehicle-To-Vehicle based services are
inefficient especially with standalone vehicle scenarios. For example, a single vehicle on
a highway would like to send a message to a faraway vehicle while there are no vehicles
between them to relay and deliver the message then they will never be able to contact
each other. While Vehicle-To-Infrastructure based services can be more efficient because
the services are guaranteed to be provided by the Road Side Equipments (RSEs) all the
way long. So that we need to develop and improve protocols and services for the V2I
communication based applications. However, we still need the V2V connections to
provide either different types of services or to serve as a redundancy or a supportive
solution for the infrastructure.
2.2 VANET Security Issues
VANET environment is very vulnerable to hacking attempts, which will result in disaster
if it happened. For that reason; robust security architecture should be created to protect
VANET environment and its members from such disasters. With the intention of creating
such robust architecture, it should cover the list of requirements below:
- Vehicles Privacy
- V2V & V2I Authentication
- Trust and revocation
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2.3 State of the Art
VANET is a fast-moving research area which attracts the intention of diverse people
from both academia and industrial background so as to make different workshops and
conferences in the direction of promoting communication amid them for advance further
research interests and actions to enable new transportation services and products, e.g.,
advanced traffic management, vehicle control, safety control, and networking and
information services for users on the road.
Moreover, many of major automotive companies have also explicated an attention
to sponsor or to participate in VANET researches, such as:
- Routing protocols for active safety in VANET.
- Challenges of V2V and V2I wireless communication.
- Wireless technology usage within cars.
- Propagation issues.
- Security issues in VANET and trustworthy networking
- Service applications Infotainment, content distribution, internet access, etc.
- Traffic management, vehicle control, and safety related applications for ITS
systems.
- Wireless Connection Quality-Of-Service in ITS systems.
- Vehicular network performance modeling and analysis, network flow &
congestion control, Architecture & communication Protocols, Medium Access
Control and Routing Protocols.
- Mobility management and intersystem handovers
- Simulation models and test-beds for VANET
- Implementation and field tests of VANET Systems
- Potential modifications needed to improve the DSRC standard.
- Incentive, cooperation, and reputation systems.
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2.4 Related Work Summary
According to our literature review, none of the researchers have created a common
specification language for VANET. If we have to have a look at [BLUM J., 2004],
[FARKAS C. 2007], [SOMMER C., 2008], [ZHAO J., 2008], [GUEMARI L., 2001],
[BALON N., (2006)], [BAUMANN R., 2004], [SCHROTH C., 2006], and [LARSSON
T., 1998], all of them have worked on VANET Projects or related to VANET, but none
of them has specified the system or the application created. Instead of that, they just
jumped into the simulation part by using couple of simulators such as Ns2, OMNeT++,
or OPNeT, with the help of programming languages such as C++. This means they have
almost involved in the implementation phase of a system development, and this what we
(Researchers) would like to avoid because if an error occurred then fixing it would cost
much more than what it does when we discover the error at the formal specification
phase. The reason for not using a formal specification language by the researchers is the
inexistence of any formal specification language precisely created to represent VANET
systems. Many formal specification languages have been created for other purposes
rather than specifying VANET systems. For example, LOTOS (Language of Temporal
Ordering Specifications), CASL (Common Algebraic Specification Language), Larch (a
set of languages), Z Notations (Zermelo-Frankel Specification language) and many
others, all of those languages are for specifying different types of computer systems, but
none of them is able to specify VANET systems, and that is because of the unique
features for VANET systems. Refer to section 5.3 for more detailed comparison between
our language and more than other 12 formal specification languages.
In the next chapter we are going to illustrate the three methodologies we followed
to achieve our three objectives.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
In this section, we are going to demonstrate the methodology we have used to create our
Formal Specification Language. Then we will show how to use and how effective is the
language that we have created by showing some VANET system examples which we
have created to solve the message delivery via VANET by referring to its abilities in high
speed driving & hard highway monitoring problems, stolen car locating problem, and
long police car chasing problem.
3.1 Proposed Used Basic symbols / Notation
Our specification language consists of symbols and notations which are categorized into
six groups. Each group can be used to show or present different aspect; Device Ability
(DA), Device Movement (DM), Messages Exchangeability (ME), Device Internal
Behavior (IB) logic, Security (Sc), and Design & Configuration (D&C) rules. In the next
subsections, we will describe each category and its symbols.
3.1.1 Device Ability
The following symbols can be used to express the abilities of a device:
A B A can reach B, while B can NOT.
A B both of A & B can reach each other.
A Ξ B A controls B – A has the jurisdiction over B
A θ B A sees B
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3.1.2 Device Movement
The following symbols can be used to illustrate the movement of the mobile nodes with
the system (To show scenarios):
A ► B A moves to/reaches/towards area B
A ◄ B A moves away from B
A ▲ B A speeds up within area B
A ▼ B A slow down within area B
A ⌂ B A stops within B
A A U-turns
A ╬ A reaches an intersection
A ╦ Reaches a T-Blocked road
A  A Turns-Right/South
A  A Turns- Left/North
A ~ (x,y) A is moving from Lane-x to Lane-y
3.1.3 Messages exchangeability
The following notations can be used to show the message flow between the system’s
devices:
A ~x> B A sends a message type-x to B
A ~~> B A forwards the incoming message into B
A ~x○ B A Propagates a message type-x to layer-B
A ○x~ B From area A, many devices are sending message type-x to Device B
A ○~~ B From area A, many devices are sending different messages of
different types to Device B
A <x~ B A receives back a reply message type-x from B
Mtx-1 Waiting for a reply message (Type-x Message)
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To define the message of a system:
MtX: Source, Destination, Message_Flow_Type , <<message_Fields>>
Where:
Source: The source device that creates this kind of messages.
Destination: The destination device that receives and reacts to such message type.
Message_Flow_Type: The packet type as attributes (e.g.; Multicast, Unicast,
Broadcast, Multi-hop, Single hope)
Message_Fields: all the data fields of that message type in an ordered sequence.
In case there is more than one probability of source or destination devices, then we
list the devices in one field by separating them by or sign “ | ”, as following:
MtX: Source-1 | source-2 |…. | Source-n, Destination-1 | … Destination-n,
Message_Flow_Type , <<message_Fields>>
Where 0 < n < ∞.
To express a message at different layers:
<X> An Application layer packet of type X.
[X] A Network layer packet of type X.
For any block of algorithm can be presented as follow:
Label: <Label>
<Body>






To call any block, we can just write the key word Lbl: followed by the label name.
Example:
Lbl: Block-A
3.1.4 Device Internal behavior logic
The following notations and expressions can be used to show how exactly the internal
behavior for the devices is:
F1 F2 Function-1 Sparks / Calls Function-2
F1(_, X) ≈> O(Y) , (X) Function 1 forwards value X as an input to O (where O is
a Device or a Function) to get Y as the output from O.
SQL(a, b, c,…) ≈> X insert a record into table X
SQL(a, b, c,…) <≈ X Get a record values (a,b,c,…) by SQL Query from table X
on the Database server.
Gf (Output),(input) [<≈ souce]
Gf (x, y, z,...),() <≈ A Or Gf (x, y, z,...) <≈ A Means: Get (x,y,z,…) by
Get_function from A. Where A can be a register or a table.
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Both of the following two lines mean: Get n values by Get_function from the user
interface of device X, then assign these values into (x,y,z,…), respectively. Where n is a
positive integer number. No input.
Gf (x, y, z,...),() <≈ X_Int
Or
Gf (x, y, z,...) <≈ X_Int
Meanwhile the following line means: Get the output of the Get_function of table
Y when sending the values (a, b, c,…), and assign the result to variable X.
Gf (X), (a, b, c,…) <≈ Y
The following is a list of some basic comparative operators, mathematical and
logic operations:







(A & B & …) C, D if (A & B) then C & D
(A & B & …) ! C if Not (A & B & …) then C
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3.1.5 Security
The following symbols concern the systems security but have a note that we did not
cover all the security aspects, these notations can be used to show a symbol
authentication between devices:
A Ŧ B A trusts B without authentication or already authenticated
A <Ŧ> B A and B trust each other without authentication or already authenticated
A Ŧ Bk A trusts B with authentication Key (k)
A <Ŧ> Bk A trusts B with authentication Key (k), while B trusts A without a Key.
Ag <Ŧ> Bk A trusts B with authentication Key (k) and B trusts A with
authentication Key (g).
A !Ŧ B A Does NOT trust B
A !<Ŧ> B A and B do not trust each other.
A <!Ŧ> B A does not trust B, while B trusts A.
A <Ŧ!> B A trusts B, while B does not trust A.
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3.1.6 Validity Test
The formal specification language will be used to prove any system or scenario is valid.
This validity test will make sure that all operations are valid by proving that all of their
steps are valid. See the following example figure:
Figure 3.1: Validity / Consistency Test Example
We have come out with a system that has three devices (D1, D2, D3). The main aim of
this system is sending a signal message X from D1 and receiving a reply message
(Message Y) for that signal. For validating the system, we need to validate its main
operation. This can be done by starting the validation from the least operations going up.
In other words, a whole system’s operation can be divided into smaller groups of sub-
operations; each group has a set of sequenced mini operations. Each of these mini
operations can be divided into smaller units depending on the system’s complexity.
In Figure 3.1, there are two sub-operations; Green Operation and Red Operation,
which will composite the main operation. These two operations themselves are
compounded by more sub-operations (Op.1 through Op.6). These are assumed to be the
lowest level operations to be validated.
D1 D2 D3
Op. 1
Op. 2 Op. 3
Green Operation: Delivering Message X from D1 to D3
Op. 1: D1 is Sending Message X
Op. 2: D2 is Processing/ Forwarding Message X
Op. 3: D3 is Receiving Message X
Red Operation: Delivering Message Y from D3 to D1
Op. 4: D3 is Creating / Sending Message Y
Op. 5: D2 is Processing / Forwarding Message Y
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According to logic, the validity rule is; “A set of sentences are considered valid,
if and only if there is no line in the system’s operation truth table having all of its
statements are True while the conclusion is False.”. Thus we have to go through the
entire truth table and check all the lines whether there is or not a line that breaks the
validity rule. Refer Table 3.1, the first line; the Op.1, Op.2, and Op.3 are True and their
conclusions (Message X was delivered) was true as well, then the Green operation is
valid. In the meantime, the Red Operation is valid as well for the same reason. Finally,
since both of the Operations are valid, then the whole system is valid, but not quite yet,
we have to check the rest of the lines in the truth table to make sure there is no such line
that breaks the validity rule. See the following sentences to understand how each lines of
the truth table were constructed:
Green Operation Validityx = !(!Msg_X_Delivered & Op.1 & Op.2 & Op.3)
Red Operation Validityx = !(!Msg_Y_Delivered & Op.4 & Op.5 & Op.6)
Whole System validityx= Green_Operation_Validityx & Red_Operation_Validityx
Where x is an integer, 0 < x < ∞, the number of the case (One line in the
truth table).
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For the second line in Table 3.1, it cannot be considered as the validity measurement
because there is at least one false statement (Op.2 is False and caused the faultiness for
the rest of the sentences). For third line in the truth table, the Green Operations are valid
because all of the sentences and the conclusion are True, while for the Red Operation, all
the statements are true but the conclusion for some reason is false, that would cause the
Invalidity for the whole system.







A whole system operation would be divided into levels of groups as shown in Figure 3.2
below. Each level is a group of its units, e.g. the lowest level represents groups of steps,
and the second lowest level has groups of algorithms. Each level’s unit is a set of the
units of the lower level. For example, Algorithm is a set of steps, and a sub-operation is a
set of algorithms and so on. Both of the validity and the consistency tests start from the
least level going up.
Figure 3.2: System operational grouping
The following set of equations is applicable on each pair of levels in Figure 3.2,
when each level’s unit is a WHOLE to the lower level:
OpVa1 = !(Low-Op.1 & Low-Op.2 & … & Low-Op.n & !Conclusion)
Where:
OpVa1: Operation_a (e.g. Green Operation) Validity with the first set of
parameters, where OpVa is a set of n of the Lower level operations
(Low-Op), where n is a positive integer number 0 < n < ∞.
OpVam: Operation_a (e.g. Green Operation) Validity with the n’th set of
parameters, where m is a positive integer number 0 < m < ∞.
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Whole System Validity1 (WSV1)= OpVa1 & OpVb1 & … & OpVn1
Where:
Whole System Validity1: the whole system validity (at a level) with the first
set of the parameters.
The final result for the validity test is:
WSVT = WSV1 & WSV2 & … & WSVn
Where:
WSVT: The final result for the whole system validity, (T) for Total.
n: is a positive integer number, 0 < n < ∞.
3.1.7 Consistency Test
In order to prove that any system or scenario is consistent then we have to make sure that
there is at least one full line in the system truth table that all of its operations and the
conclusion are true.
According to logic, the consistency rule is; “A set of sentences are considered
consistent, if and only if there is at least one line in the system’s operation truth table
having all of its statements and the conclusion True.”
In Table 3.2, we can see the first line satisfies the consistency rule then we can
conclude that the whole system is consistent.
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If we have a look to at the third line, we find all the operations are True just like
the first line but the conclusion is False, this means there are two ways for the system to
implement and to achieve the same goal at two different sets of parameters. The system
passed the consistency test with the first set of the parameters but failed with the seconds
set. To find the consistency of a Whole-Operation, we have to make sure that all the sub-
Operations are Consistent. See the following equation:
CTx = Op.1 & Op.2 & … & Op.n & Conclusion
Where:
CTX: Consistency Test for the Whole-Operation X
There are some systems which have both compulsory and optional operations.
Therefore the consistency test should be repeated at least twice with two different cases
to make sure that the system is consistent with such a scenario. The tests will be applied
as the following:
- First time we apply it on the system without considering the optional operation
groups.
- Secondly, we apply the test on the system with considering the first group of the
optional operation.
- The whole system consistency test will be repeated depends on the number of
the Optional operations groups, see the following:
Number of the CTs = Number of the Optional Operations Groups + 1
Where the value (one) added refers to the first test when we apply the test on the
system (Compulsory Operations only) without considering any of the optional operations.
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Now the consistency test final result will be found from:
Whole system consistency = CT1 | CT2 | … | CTn
Where:
CT1: Consistency Test for the system with the first set of parameters
n: is a positive integer number, 0 < n < ∞.
And the consistency probability (robustness) can be found by:
Consistency Probability = (Number of Successful Tests / Total Number of the
Tests) * 100 %
3.1.8 Design and Configuration
In order to show the design of a system and set its devices configuration, first, we need to
show the architecture entities and the internal relations between all the entities of the
participated devices. Then explain each of them, by showing the setup of the whole
system (how entities can be related/connected to each other). Finally we will display the
configuration of the devices. For that purpose we can use the following syntaxes:
Let A = Device-a
A = {set of components}
A set of components can be any set of hardware components, functions, and/or
properties.
Or if we want to talk about a group of devices or devices clustering, then:
Let Aa = Group (a) of Device-A
To set the properties of device Ax values:
Ax_Property: < Propert Value >
(e.g.; Ax_ID: Rsq56)
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To show the ports of each device, we can present them as a set of ports:
Let SP = {Set of Ports}
(e.g.; SP= {P1, P2, …})
To set the configuration of each port:
Px_Property: < Property Value >
e.g.; P1_IP: < Ip address >
P1_MAC: < MAC address >
To show the functions of each device, we can present them as a set of functions:
Let SF = {Set Of Functions}
e.g; SF = {F1, F2,…}
Then show a brief explanation about each of the functions listed in the set, we can
use one of the two methods; the first is by using a plain text to describe the function:
Let F1: <Plain Text Description>
e.g.; FMtc: Checks the type of the incoming message & decides the destiny of the
incoming message.
Or we can use the second method, which tells what kind of inputs should be given
to the function, and what kind of outputs we expect of that function:
Let F1: I(List of Input Parameters), O(List of Outputs)
Where ‘I’ stands for “Input”
And ‘O’ stands for “Output”
e.g.; FMtc:I(incoming message), O(incoming Message’s Data, next function code)
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Finally, to write the body of any function, all we have to do is follow the
function’s header through the steps which combine the function’s body included within
two brackets. See bellow:






Where: F1 is a function that has n of steps, 0 < n < ∞.
3.1.9 Environment description
We can use these symbols to describe the scenario’s roads directions, their status
(Crowded, Terminated,…etc.) and the position of the vehicles on the road (over which
lane the vehicle is, or to which direction it will go). See Figure 3.3.
Let RN: Northern Road (towards the North)
RS: Southern Road (towards the South)
RE: Eastern Road (towards the East)
RW: Western Road (towards the West)
Figure 3.3: Standards Directions





To specify the instant lane the vehicle is over, we can specify it by adding the
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Let RNL1: Northern Road – LANE 1
RNL2: Northern Road – LANE 2
… and So on.
Moreover for the right- hand side driver’s road system, lanes counting starts from
the left side of the road. e.g.; For Malaysia, lane 1 is the one on the left of the road, while
Lane n (Where n is a number 0 < n < ∞) is the one on the right side of the road.
For the left-hand side driver’s road systems, lanes counting starts from the right
side of the road. e.g.; For Iraq, lane 1 is the one on the right side of the road, while Lane n
(where n is a number 0 < n < ∞) is the one on the left side of the road.
To specify the features for road, we just add the feature keyword to the Road
name, as bellow:
Let RN_feature-keyword = <Value-Of-The-Feature>
Example:
Let RN_Allowed_Speed = 70 Km/h
Let RSE_Crowded = True
Let RNW_Terminated = False
To tell on which road the vehicle is, we use:
A --: Rx Means: Vehicle A is driving on Road Rx. The symbol (--) was derived
from the shape of the street lining. And the second part (:) was derived from Traffic light
stops.
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And to tell how big the coverage area of the device is, we use:
Let A Ø <m> Means: The Coverage radius of device-A is m, where m is a
positive integer number represents the radius in Meters.
To tell how far is the device from another, we use:
Let A ○-○ B: <m> The distance between device-A and device-B is m, where m
is a positive integer number represents the distance in Meters.
To tell the Three-Dimensional position of an object or another device with reference to a
device, we use:
Let A –xyz B: <#x> <#y> <#z> with reference to Device-A, Device/Object-B
is located at position <#x> <#y> <#z>, where #x, #y, #z are three numbers refer to the
Axis-position.
3.1.10 Connections description
To illustrate the type of connection between two devices, we use:
A >--< B: <Value>
Where Value is the connection type (e.g., Wired, Wireless, Wi-Fi, …etc.)
We can use one of the many options given to show the connection between devices
which is then separated by Comma:
B >--< A: <Value_1>, <Value_2>,…, or <Value_n>
Where: 0 < n < ∞.
We might need to tell about the status of the connection at a specific moment (e.g.;
Active, Inactive, Listening,…etc. ) then we use this sentence:
A >--< B_Status: <Value_1>
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For the description of connection at the system definition we might want to tell the
range of status for values that can be taken by the connection which is being used:
A >--< B_RStatus: <Value_1>, <Value_2>,…, or <Value_n>
Where: 0 < n < ∞.
For any other property of the connection that we want to illustrate, we can follow this
sentence:
A >--< B_<Property_Keyword>: <Value>
Example:
A >--< B_<Bandwidth >: 1 Mb
In the next sections we are going to illustrate the details of each category and its
combined notations by showing how to use them. In order to do that, we will show some
examples depending on a layered system model which we designed to solve the message
delivery among the participated devices within a VANET environment. Therefore, the
first next section we will use to illustrate the proposed layered system model. Then we
carry out with the details of the categories.
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3.2 Layered System Model for VANET Environment & Application Layer Protocol
In this section, we illustrate our proposed layered system and formally specify the
messages exchanged within its algorithms using our own logic notations (Refer Section
3.1).
Table 3.3: Layered System Specific functions description
Mtc
Is a function that checks the Message type (Mt) & decides the destiny of the
incoming message.
PAz
Is the incoming packet analyzer function, it analyses the packet according to the
packet type.
SF Is a set of “Set functions”.
GF Is a set of “Get functions”.
SQL
Is the function that creates SQL statements, their type (Query or Setting type)
depends on the Mtc function’s output.
PFr Is a function that is responsible of forwarding packets to ports.
PCr
Is a function used to create Packets, their type (Unicast / Broadcast, speed code or
searching packets ) depends also on the output of the Mtc function.
Our layered model was derived from the Object Oriented Programming (OOP) Idea
when each class has many objects those would get the functions and the features from
that parent class in addition to their unique functions and features. So we have mapped
the OOP idea to fit the VANET environment and create a Model that has many layers
(each layer just like a Class), each has some features and functions those to inherit to the
devices (objects) operate at that specific layer. Each device has functions and interfaces
to communicate and interact among the devices. See [BOOCH G., 1994].
Our system has N number of layers but for the example purpose we are showing three
layers with four devices we have specified, see Figure 3.4, the three layers are.
1- Layer one: Co-ordination layer (L1)
2- Layer two: Distribution Layer (L2)
3- Layer three: Host Layer (L3)
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Figure 3.4 – Our proposed Layered system
3.2.1 System Devices
Each layer has its own n number of devices to work in. Each of those devices has its own
functions, tables, number of ports, variables (registers that keep the configuration in). For
further description of the device, we can list its components as a set, and then describe
each component separately as a sub-set of other components and so on. See the following
device descriptions:
1- Layer 1 Devices (α):
Using our Specification language words set to describe the layer α:




n: a number, where 0 < n < ∞
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Now to describe each device of layer-α that has its own components, we have to
use a set of rules by listing its components:
Let αA = { αAF, αAT, αAP} // Leyer α Device-A has three major components
Where:
αAF: L1 Device-A Functions
αAT: L1 Device-A Tables
αAP: L1 Device-A Ports
Finally, we have to describe each component in each device by saying:
And let:
αAF = { αMtc, αPaz, αSf, αGf, αSQL, αPcr, αPfr, *** MORE FUNCTIONS***}
// the above sentence lists the functions set of the αA device. The list might be
extended into a longer one depending on the device design (This is what ***
MORE FUNCTIONS*** refers to). See Table 3.1 to know the duty of each of
the functions in the list.
αAT = {αSpc[a][b], αSMT[c][d], αVT[e][f], αSCT[g][h], ToR[i][j]}
// the above sentence lists the tables set of the αA device.
αAP = {αP1, αP2} // Tells the set of ports in device the αA.
Finally, we combine all of the sets to present the device as one single set as shown
below:
αA = { αMtc, αPaz, αSf, αGf, αSQL, αPcr, αPfr, αSpc[a][b], αSMT[c][d], αVT[e][f], αSCT[g][h],
αToR[i][j], αP1, αP2}
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2- Layer 2 Devices (β):
We repeat the same procedure with layer-β:




n: a number, where 0 < n < ∞
Let βA = { βAF, βAT, βAV, βAP}
Where:
βA: L2 Device-A
βAF: L2 Device-A Functions
βAT: L2 Device-A Tables
βAV: L2 Device-A Variables
βAP: L2 Device-A Ports
And Let:
βAF = { βMtc, βPaz, βSf, βGf, βPcr, βPfr, *** MORE FUNCTIONS***}
// The above sentence lists the functions set of the βA device. The list might be
extended into a longer one depending on the device design (This is what ***
MORE FUNCTIONS*** refers to). Refer Table 3.1 to know the duty of each of
the functions in the list.
βAT = {βVT[e][f], βSCT[g][h]}
// the above sentence lists the tables set of the βA device.
βAV = {βSpc, βRsq}
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// the above sentence lists the registers set of the βA device. These registers keep the
device configuration values in it.
βAP = {βP1, βP2, βP3} // Display the set of ports in device the βA.
By combining all the previous sets together in one single set we get:
βA = { βMtc, βPaz, βSf, βGf, βPcr, βPfr, βVT[e][f], βSCT[g][h], βSpc, βRsq, βP1, βP2, βP3}
3- Layer 3 Devices (Γ):
Using our Specification language words set to describe the layer Γ:




n: a number, where 0 < n < ∞
In layer-Γ, we got two devices, so we present them separately:
For device-A of layer3 ( ΓA ):
Let ΓA = { ΓAF, ΓAT, ΓAP}
Where:
ΓA: L3 Device-A
ΓAF: L3 Device-A Functions
ΓAT: L3 Device-A Tables
ΓAP: L3 Device-A Ports
And Let:
ΓAF = { ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, *** MORE FUNCTIONS***}
// the above sentence lists the functions set of the ΓA device. The list might be
extended into a longer one depending on the device design (This is what ***
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MORE FUNCTIONS*** refers to). See Table 3.1 to know the duty of each of
the functions in the list.
ΓAT = {ΓRT[e][f], ΓST[g][h]}
// the above sentence lists the tables set of the ΓA device.
ΓAP = {ΓP1, ΓP2} } // Tells the set of ports in device the ΓA.
Then:
ΓA = { ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, ΓRT[e][f], ΓST[g][h], ΓP1, ΓP2}
For device-B of layer3:
Let ΓB = { ΓBF, ΓBT, ΓBV, ΓBP}
Where:
ΓB: L3 Device-B
ΓBF: L3 Device-B Functions
ΓBT: L3 Device-B Tables
ΓBV: L3 Device-B Variables
ΓBP: L3 Device-B Ports
And Let:
ΓBF = {ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, *** MORE FUNCTIONS***}
// the above sentence lists the functions set of the ΓB device. The list might be
extended into a longer one depending on the device design (This is what ***
MORE FUNCTIONS*** refers to). See Table 3.1 to know the duty of each of
the functions in the list.
ΓBT = {ΓRT[e][f]}
// the above sentence lists the tables set of the ΓB device.
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ΓBV = {ΓSCT_Flag}
// the above sentence lists the registers set of the ΓB device. These registers keep the
device configuration values in it.
ΓBP = {ΓP1} // Tells the set of ports in device the ΓB.
Then:
ΓB = {ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr , ΓPfr, ΓRT[e][f], ΓSCT_Flag, ΓP1}
3.2.2 Assumptions
- All connections are assumed to be Bi-Directional & existent connections when
ever needed.
- An existent Routing Protocol has already been configured by the system
administrator.
- The connection between α & β devices is assumed to be existing 24 hours a day
for 7 days a week.
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3.2.3 Devices Communications
- The connections between α & β devices can be wired, wireless or any other
communication media type, however the connection between β & Γ devices
should be wireless.
α >--< β: Wire, Wireless, or others
Β >--< Γ: Wireless
- Connection between β & Γ devices can be Active or Inactive connections.
- ΓB can have only one active connection, either with ΓA or βA devices.
- β devices can communicate with each other.
- α – To – β – To - β connections supposed to have IP/MAC address filters to
prevent any hacking attempts. Hence, with the existence of such filters, the
trustiness between the devices does not need for the authentication any more. The
sentence below shows that device α and β trust each other completely without the
need for an authentication key. Please notice that our Specification language, so





- β – To - Γ – To – β connections should be secured using some kind of
authentication process. The sentence below shows that device β trusts device Γ




- Layer-1 devices can communicate with Layer-2’s & Layer-2 devices can
communicate with Layer-1 devices when required:
αA βA
- At the same time, Layer-1 devices have a full control on Layer-2 & Layer-3
devices:
αA  Ξ βA
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And:
αA Ξ Γx
- Layer-2 devices are connected to each other so they can reach each other:
βAx βAy
- Layer-2 Devices can reach Layer-3 devices when required and Layer-3 devices
can reach layer-2 devices:
βA Γx
- So, Layer-1 Devices can reach Layer-3’s only through layer-2 devices.
αA βA Γx
- Layer-3 device-B, has limited abilities compares to Layer-1 Device-A, ΓB can







- As well as, Layer-3 Device-A can control Layer-3 device-B:
ΓA Ξ ΓB
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3.2.4 The Application Layer Protocol Abilities
Our proposed protocol has the following abilities:
- Issuing & delivering orders to remote nodes.
- Receiving and saving reports from remote nodes.
- Issuing & delivering services to remote nodes.
- Locating a remote node.
- Provide secured access to devices.
In the next sections, we show the abilities of our protocol through showing its 24
messages abilities and categorize them as how they interact with each other as three
phases.
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3.2.4.1 Remote Speed limit phase
These are the messages in remote speed limit phase:
1- Issuing Speed code Message
2- Broadcast Speed Code Message
3- Issue/send L1 Node status report
4- Unicast L1 Node status report
FIGURE 3.5: Remote Speed limit phase Message Flow
Starting by Message 1, a layer-1 device-A generates and sends a speed code to a
layer-2 device that will forward the same message type (MtQ) into the next Layer-2
device and broadcast the contents of the incoming message in MtR to Layer-3 devices
(Message 3).
When a layer-3 device-A receives the MtR, it starts to create and sends out a
message that has the device’s status at that moment (Message 4 - MtS) to the Layer-2
device which in turn will uncast the status report to the layer-1 device (Message 5 - MtT).
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1- Issuing Speed code Message
When Layer-2 Device-A receives a message, it checks its type to decide what and how
would it be analyzed:
αA ~Q> βAx: <MtQ, #Hp, #SpC>
Let IMsg = <MtQ, #Hp, #SpC>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Let NMsg1= <MtQ, #Hp-1, #SpC>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (#Hp, #SpC) , βPcr(NMsg1)
βPcr βPfr (NMsg1, βP3)
When the Mtc function finds out that the incoming message type is MtQ, it will
call Paz function to start analyzing the rest of the message as (#Hp, #SpC), as well as,
Mtc will call Pfr function to forward the message to the next Layer-2 device-A.
2- Broadcast Speed Code Message
After Layer-2 device analyzes the incoming message into its values, Paz would sparks
Pcr function to create a new message typed-R (MtR) that will be propagated to Layer-3
Devices (Γ) through port-2 (βP2) by βPfr function:
βA ~R> ΓB: <MtR, Rsq(βAx), #SpC>
Let NMsg2 = βPcr (MtR, Rsq(βAx), #SpC)
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
βPcr βPFr(NMsg2, βP2)
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3- Issue/send L1 Node status report
When a layer-3 Device-B receives the propagated message, it will first try to identify the
message type by using ΓMtc:
ΓB ~S> βA: <MtS, CR>
Let IMsg = <MtR, Rsq(βAx), #SpC>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Now, Mtc’s function is to recognize the message type as MtR, it will call Paz
function to analyze the rest of the incoming message as (Rsq(βAx), #SpC):
Let NMsg3 = <MtS, CR>
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (Rsq(βAx), #SpC) , ΓPcr(NMsg3)
ΓA will keep the information of the incoming message source device in RT table:
(Rsq(βAx), RSE_IP) ≈> ΓRT[][]
As we can see, Mtc sparked Pcr function to create a message type-S that contains the
report (CR) that will be unicasted to the RSE that is currently in touch with (this can be
found in RT table).
ΓPcr ΓPfr(NMsg3, ΓP1)
4- Unicast L1 Node status report
After receiving an incoming message by a Layer-2 Device-A and recognized its type as
MtS, its Mtc function will call Paz to analyze the rest of the message as (CR), and saves a
copy of that report in its VT. Then creates a unicast message that includes the report and
the RSE’s Rsq.
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βA ~T> αA: <MtT, CR, Rsq>
Let IMsg = <MtS,CR>
Let NMsg4 = <MtT, CR, Rsq>
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (CR), βPcr(NMsg4)
(CR) ≈> βVT[e][f]
βPcr βPfr(NMsg4)
Now, a layer-1 Device-A receives a message, its Mtc function will adopt that
message up to recognize its type. After recognizing the type is S, the Mtc function will
sparks Paz to read the next bits of the incoming message as the report and where does it
come from (CR,Rsq).
Let IMsg = <MtS, CR>
αMtc (IMsg) αPaz (CR)
Now, the report is ready to be saved into database:
αPaz αSQL(CR, Rsq) ≈> αVT[e][f]
3.2.4.2 Sending a service message to a Layer-3 Device phase
First of all, a manual human interaction should be done by the system administrator to
query the details of the Layer-1 device from its own VT table. However, if could not find
them then try to query the central DB. By assuming the data were found and the layer-3
Device still within the coverage of Layer-3 Device-A. Then using the following
messages, we can approach the Layer-3 Device and deliver a service message to:
1- Sending a service Message
2- Broadcast the service Message
3- Sending a Reply of the service
4- Unicast the Reply of the service to Layer-1 Device-A
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FIGURE 3.6: Sending a service message to a Layer-3 Device phase Message Flow
By sending the service message (MtU) to a layer-2 device-A, the last will
broadcast it to all Layer-2 devices (MtV) and forward it to the next Layer-2 devices.
When a layer-3 device receives that service message, it will apply the service and reply
the application result (Successful, not successful, or some other predefined value). The
reply can reach from Layer-3 device to layer-1’s, through two messages; the first will
deliver the reply from Layer-3 to layer-2 device (MtW), while the second is (MtX) which
will be unicasted by layer-2 device to Layer-1’s.
Let’s illustrate the abilities of the layered system at the Sending a service message
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1- Sending a service Message
When Layer-2 Device-A receives a message, it checks its type to decide what how would
it be analyzed:
αA ~U> βA: <MtU, Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX >
Let IMsg = <MtU, Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX >
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Let NMsg1= <MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX) , βPcr(NMsg1)
βPcr βPfr (NMsg1, βP3)
When its Mtc function finds out that the incoming message’s type is MtU. It will
call Paz function to start analyzing the rest of the message as (Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX),
where XXX can be a useful information for the required service, as well as, Mtc will call
Pfr function to forward the message to the next Layer-2 device.
2- Broadcast the service Message
After Layer-2 device analyzes the incoming message into its values, Paz will sparks Pcr
function to create a new message typed-V (MtV) that will be propagated to Layer-3
Devices (Γ) through port-2 (βP2) by βPfr function:
βA ~V> ΓB: <MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX>
Let NMsg2 = βPcr(MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX)
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
βPcr βPFr(NMsg2, βP2)
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3- Sending a Reply of a service
When a layer-3 Device-B receives the propagated message, it will first try to identify the
message type by using ΓMtc.
ΓB ~W> βA: <MtW, SPN#, Value>
Let IMsg =<MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Now, Mtc’s function is to recognize the message type as MtV, it will call Paz’s
function to analyze the rest of the incoming message as (SPN#, Value, XXX):
Let NMsg3 = <MtW, SPN#, Value>
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (SPN#, Value, XXX), ΓPcr(NMsg3)
ΓPaz ΓFX
Where ΓFX is any service function
After the service implementation has been done, an output of that function will
appear; that will be presented by a value that could be successful, unsuccessful, or any
other predefined value. This value will be inserted into an MtW message and sent
through Port 1 of Layet-3 Device-A to the RSE (Currently in touch with).
ΓPcr ΓPfr(NMsg3, ΓP1)
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4- Unicast the Reply of a service to Layer-1 Device-A
After receiving an incoming message by a Layer-2 Device-A, and recognizing its type as
MtW, its Mtc function will call Paz to analyze the rest of the message as (Rsq, SPN#,
Value). Then create a unicast message (MtX) which includes the service reply, Layer-3
device ID, and the RSE’s Rsq this message is unicasted from, to the layer-1 Device-A.
βA ~X> αA: <MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value>
Let IMsg = <MtW, SPN#, Value>
Let NMsg4 = <MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value>
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Rsq, SPN#, Value), βPcr(NMsg4)
βPcr βPfr(NMsg4, βP1)
Now, a layer-1 Device-A receives a message, its Mtc function will adopt that
message up to recognize its type. After finding the type is X, the Mtc function will sparks
Paz to read the next bits of the incoming message as the service reply and where does it
come from (Rsq, SPN#, Value).
Let IMsg = <MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value>
αMtc (IMsg) αPaz (Rsq, SPN#, Value)
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3.2.4.3 Getting access from a mobile node into another node phase
This phase starts by the user of Layer-3 device-A inputs an ID of a layer-3 Device-B
through its user interface and send a request message to a layer-2 Device-A. It tries to get
the full information of that device-B before it can get access to it.
The following are the messages used in the phase of getting access from a mobile
node into another mobile node:
1- Access Authentication Request (MtB-1)
2- Reply - Access Authentication Request
3- Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtD-1)
4- Reply – Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtC, MtF)
5- Copy of Layer-3 Device-A info
6- Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtD-1)
7- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtH-1)
8- Reply - Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtG)
9- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtJ-1)
10- Reply – Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtK, MtI)
11- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request
12- Copy of Layer-3 Device-B SPN#’s info
13- Access Request & Speed information (MtP-1)
14- PID availability enquiry (MtO-1)
15- Reply - PID availability enquiry (MtN)
16- Reply for Access request (MtM)
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FIGURE 3.7: Getting access from a mobile node into another node phase Message Flow
By sending an Access Authentication request message (MtA) to a layer-2 device-
A, it will check for the existence of the source node (which is Layer-3 Device-A) in its
SCT Table. If the data exists, then it will reply with a positive Access authentication
reply (MtB). Otherwise, it will try to ask for those data from the two previous layer-2
devices (MtC), which will reply with a positive reply message if the requested data is
exist in the SCT table of any of them (MtD). If it is not found, then it will send a request
to the Layer-1 Device-A (MtF) asking for the same information, that will also check for
the availability for that information. If it has been found, it will unicast it (MtD) to the
layer-2 device-A which first start with the query, while a negative reply will be issued in
case of the none existence.
When the (destination) layer-2 device-A receives the MtD message, it will unicast
it to the Layer-3 device-A (which asked for the information) and forwards a copy of those
information (MtE) to the next ten layer-2 devices to guarantee the information delivery to
people who have requested for layer-2 device. In case of receiving the requested data by
























CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 54
L2DA. According to L3DA, it might need to get information for another L3DB so it can
get access to the last, which can query the L2DA (MtG) to get from them.
The same sequence will be repeated after looking at L3DB’s information, but this
time L2DA searches in its ST table, the messages are different, and the result reply will
be (MtH) sent to the L3DA.
Finally, assume that L3DA has gotten the information of the other L3DB, now it
can try to authenticate into that device (MtM) using these information. L3DB will check
the trustworthy of the source node of MtM message by asking the L2DA (MtN). Lastly, it
will look for a match of the node’s ID in its SCT table. Once it has been found, then it
will reply through a positive MtO to the L3DB, which consequently sends out a unicast
of positive reply to the L3DA telling that now it can read from / write on it.
Let’s illustrate the abilities of the layered system at getting access from a mobile
node into another node phase in detailed manner:
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1- Access Authentication Request (MtB-1)
Message type-A is a created by ΓA and sent to βA as a unicast message.
When βA receives the message, it checks the type to decide what how would it be
analyzed:
ΓA ~A> βA: <MtA, PID, Pswd>
Let IMsg = <MtA, PID, Pswd>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Let NMsg1= <MtB, Value>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2 = <MtC, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (PID, Pswd) (PIDS, PswdS) <≈ βSCT
Where PIDS: PID Value stored in the SCT table
PswdS: The stored Pswd value in SCT
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS  βPcr(NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS ! βPcr(-NMsg1), βPcr(NMsg2)
Where: “ -NMsg “ means Negative New Message
βPcr(-NMsg1) βPfr (-NMsg1, βP2)
βPcr(NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP1)
When the Mtc function finds out that the incoming message’s type is MtA. It will
call Paz function to start analyzing the rest of the message as (PID, Pswd). At the same
time, it looks for the PIDS & PswdS in the SCT table. If it has been found, then it will
compare PID with PIDS and Pswd with PswdS. If they matched, then βA will create a
positive reply message (MtB) and forward it to port to as a unicast message to ΓA. If the
values are not matching to each other, then a negative MtB message will be sent to ΓA.
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While in case of none existence of PID’s information in the SCT Table, βA will
create a query message (MtC) and forward it to the two previous Layer-2 devices by
asking them for those missed information, probably, those information are exists in the
first previous βDevice.
2- Reply - Access Authentication Request
There are four different types of MtB messages to be sent by layer-2 devices and be
received by layer-3 devices. When the last layer receives the message it will check the
type of the message, this would be done by Mtc.
ΓA <B~ βA: <MtB, Value>
Let IMsg =<MtB, Value>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Let NMsg1= <MtG, PID, SPN#>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (Value)
After Mtc has discovered the message type, it will call Paz function to analyze the
rest of the incoming message as (Value):
(Value=0) ΓPcr(NMsg1) ΓPfr (NMsg1, ΓP1)
(Value=1)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! wrong
Password”
(Value=2) A text Message appears on the user interface “Waiting …!”
(Value=3)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! Invalid
PID’s Info.”
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3- Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtD-1)
In case of none existence of PID’s information in the SCT table of the Layer-2 device, it
will call for the help of the two previous layer-2 devices to find out the information in
their own SCT tables:
βA ~C> βA-1/2: <MtC, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp>
Let IMsg =<MtC, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
And Let Hp = 2
Let NMsg1= <MtC, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp-1>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2= <MtF, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x)>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
Let NMsg3= <MtD, Value, PID’s info>
Where: NMsg3 = New Message-3
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp) (PIDS, PswdS) <≈ βSCT
Where PIDS: PID Value stored in the SCT table
PswdS: The stored Pswd value in SCT
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS  βPcr(NMsg3) βPfr (NMsg3, βP1)
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS & Hp=0 ! βPcr(-NMsg1) βPfr (-NMsg1, βP3)
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS & Hp!=0 ! βPcr(NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP3)
Where: “-NMsg“ means Negative New Message
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4- Reply – Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtC, MtF)
When a message type-D is sent by βA-1/2 or αA to βA, it will be issued as a unicast
message, that its value will be forwarded as the unicast message (MtB) to the Layer-3
device-A (ΓA) that carries the PID as its ID.
βA <D~ βA-1/2 or αA: <MtD, Value, PID’s info>
Let IMsg= <MtD, Value, PID’s info>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1=<MtB, Value>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2=<MtE, Hp, PID’s info>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
Hp = 10
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Value, PID’s info)
βPcr(NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
(Value = 0) βPcr(NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP1)
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5- Copy of Layer-3 Device-A info
When a layer-2 device-A receives a positive Message type-D (that has the PID
information), it will forward a copy of those information to the next ten layer-2 Devices
as a MtE with Hp value of 10.
βA ~E> βA+1/10: <MtE, Hp, PID’s info>
Let IMsg= <MtE, Hp, PID’s info>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Hp = 10
Let NMsg1=<MtE, Hp-1, PID’s info>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2=<MtB, Value>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Hp, PID’s info) (PID’s info) ≈> βSCT
and (Hp-1 > 0) βPcr (NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP3)
βPcr (NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP2)
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6- Layer-3 Device-A info. Request (MtD-1)
When a layer-1 device-A receives the MtF message, it will analyze it into its prime fields
looking for the PID identification whether its information are missed and requested. So
Layer-1 Device-A will look for it in its SCT table. If it has been found, then it will issue a
MtD message and unicast it to the RSE(Rsq). On the other hand, if it has not been found,
then it will query the Database server storage.
βA-2 ~F> αA: <MtF, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x)>
Let IMsg= <MtF, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x)>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1=<MtD, Value, PID’s info, Rsq(x)>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2=(Database Server Query) ** QUERY FROM THE SQL SERVER**
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
αMtc (IMsg) αPaz (PID, Pswd, Rsq(x)) (PID’s info) <≈ αSCT
found: αPcr (NMsg1) αPfr (NMsg1, αP1)
not found: αPcr (NMsg2) αPfr (NMsg2, αP2)
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7- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtH-1)
When the layer-3 device-A receives a positive reply (+MtB) to access a layer-2 device-A,
it will create an information request message (MtG) asking for the full set of Node’s
(numbered SPN#) information and waits for the reply (MtH).
When the MtG message reaches the layer-2 device-A, it will be analyzed by the
Mtc & Paz functions respectively. Layer-2-device-A looks for the requested information
(using SPN# value) in its VT table. If it has been found, it will reply by a positive MtH
reply. If it has not been found, then the device tries to ask the two previous layer-2
devices for those information (MtI).
ΓA ~G> βA: <MtG, PID, SPN#>
Let IMsg= <MtG, PID, SPN#>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1= <MtH, Value, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2= <MtI, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x), Hp)
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
Hp = 2
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (PID, SPN#) (SPN#’s info) <≈ βVT
((SPN#’s info) <≈ βVT) βPcr (NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
((SPN#’s info) <≈ βVT) ! βPcr (NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP1)
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8- Reply - Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtG)
MtH is a service reply message sent by the layer-2 device-A and received by the layer-3
device-A, responding to the MtG’s service request message.
When MtH reaches the layer-3 device-A, it will pass through Mtc and Paz
functions to be analyzed into its prime fields values. MtH might be a positive reply or a
negative:
ΓA <H~ βA: <MtH, Value, Node SPN#’s info>
Let IMsg = <MtH, Value, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Let NMsg1= <MtM, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (Value, Node SPN#’s info)
After Mtc discovers the message type, it will call Paz function to analyze the rest
of the incoming message as (Value, Node SPN#’s info):
(Value=0) ΓPcr(NMsg1) ΓPfr (NMsg1, ΓP2)
And (Node SPN#’s info) ≈> ΓST
(Value=1)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! wrong
Password”
(Value=2) A text Message appears on the user interface “Waiting …!”
(Value=3)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! Invalid
SPN#’s Info.”
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 63
9- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtJ-1)
In case of none existence of SPN#’s information in a VT table of the Layer-2 device, it
will call for the help of the two previous layer-2 devices to find out the information in
their own VT tables:
βA ~I> βA-1/2: <MtI, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x), Hp>
Let IMsg =<MtI, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x), Hp>
Where: IMsg: Incoming Message
Hp = 2
Let NMsg1= <MtI, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x), Hp-1>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2= <MtK, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x)>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
Let NMsg3= <MtJ, Value, PID, Car SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg3 = New Message-3
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (PID, SPN#, Rsq(x), Hp) (SPN#’s info.) <≈ βVT
((SPN#’s info.) <≈ βVT) βPcr(NMsg3) βPfr (NMsg3, βP1)
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS & Hp=0 ! βPcr(-NMsg1) βPfr (-NMsg1, βP3)
PID Vs. PIDS & Pswd Vs. PswdS & Hp!=0 ! βPcr(NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP3)
Where: “-NMsg“ means Negative New Message
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10- Reply – Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request (MtK, MtI)
When a message type-J sent by βA-1/2 or αA to βA, it will be issued as the unicast message,
that its value will be forwarded as the unicast message (MtH) to the Layer-3 device-A
(ΓA) that carries the PID as its ID.
βA <J~ βA-1/2 or αA: <MtJ, Value, PID, Car SPN#’s info>
Let IMsg= <MtJ, Value, PID, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1=<MtH, Value, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2= <MtL, Hp, SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
Hp = 10
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Value, PID, Node SPN#’s info)
βPcr(NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
(Value = 0) βPcr(NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP1)
11- Layer-3 Device-B SPN# info Request
When the layer-1 device-A receives a MtK message, it will analyze it into its prime fields
looking for the SPN# number that its information are missed and requested. Therefore
Layer-1 Device-A will look for it in its VT table. If it has been found then, it will issue
the MtJ message and unicast it to the RSE(Rsq). Meanwhile if it has not been found, then
it will query the Database server storage.
βA-2 ~K> αA: <MtK, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x)>
Let IMsg= <MtK, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x)>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
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Let NMsg1= <MtJ, Value, PID, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2=(Database Server Query) ***** Standard SQL Sentence*****
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2 ** QUERY FROM THE SQL SERVER**
αMtc (IMsg) αPaz (PID, SPN#, Rsq(x)) (SPN#’s info) <≈ αVT
(SPN#’s info) <≈ αVT  αPcr (NMsg1) αPfr (NMsg1, αP1)
(SPN#’s info) <≈ αVT ! αPcr (NMsg2) αPfr (NMsg2, αP2)
12- Copy of Layer-3 Device-B SPN#’s info
When the layer-2 device-A receives a positive Message type-J (that has the SPN#’s
information), it will forward a copy of these information to the next ten layer-2 Devices
as a MtL with Hp value of 10.
βA ~L> βA-1/10: <MtL, Hp, SPN#’s info>
Let IMsg = <MtL, Hp, SPN#’s info>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Hp = 10
Let NMsg1 = <MtL, Hp-1, SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2 = <MtH, Value, Node SPN#’s info>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (Hp, SPN#’s info) (SPN#’s info) ≈> βVT
and (Hp-1 > 0) βPcr (NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP1)
βPcr (NMsg2) βPfr (NMsg2, βP2)
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13- Access Request & Speed information (MtP-1)
When the layer-3 device-A receives a MtH message with a value of zero, it means this
message has the required information to access the other layer-3 deives-B. However, it
should ask for the permission to get that access (MtM).
ΓA ~M> ΓB: <MtM, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc>
Let IMsg = <MtM, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Hp = 10
Let NMsg1 = <MtN, PID>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
Let NMsg2 = <MtP, Value>
Where: NMsg2 = New Message-2
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (Hp, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc) (SPN#s info) <≈ ΓSCT
Where: SPN#s info: stored SPN# information in the node’s registers
(SPN#’s info Vs. SPN#s info) ΓPcr (NMsg1) ΓPfr (NMsg1, ΓP1)
(SPN#’s info Vs. SPN#s info) ! ΓPcr (NMsg2) ΓPfr (NMsg2, ΓP2)
When Value of NMsg2 = 2
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14- PID availability enquiry (MtO-1)
MtN message is a validation message, it checks whether a PID node is exist or not (is it a
real PID node, or a fake one). So, when the layer-2 device-A receives the MtN message,
it analyzes and start looking for a PID match in its SCT table. If the match was found,
then it will reply with a positive MtO message to the requester node. If it was not found
then it will send a negative MtO reply.
ΓB ~N> βA: <MtN, PID>
Let IMsg = <MtN, PID>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1 = <MtO, Value>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
βMtc (IMsg) βPaz (PID) (PIDs) <≈ βSCT
Where: PIDs: a PID Match stored in the node’s SCT Table.
(PID Vs.PIDs) βPcr (NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
When Value of the NMsg1= 0
(PID Vs.PIDs) βPcr (NMsg1) βPfr (NMsg1, βP2)
When Value of the NMsg1= 1
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15- Reply - PID availability enquiry (MtN)
When the layer-3 device-B receives a positive MtO reply message from a layer-2 device-
A, it means that PID node is a valid one and it can trust it.
ΓB <O~ βA: <MtO, Value>
Let IMsg = <MtO, Value>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1 = <MtP, Value>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
ΓMtc (IMsg) ΓPaz (Value) ΓPcr (NMsg1) ΓPfr (NMsg1, ΓP1)
16- Reply for Access request (MtM)
Finally, when the Layer-3 device-A receives a positive reply from another layer-3 device-
A, it means access is granted by the other side to access it. However, if it is a negative
reply, then it means the access was denied by the other side.
ΓA <P~ ΓB: <MtP, Value>
Let IMsg = <MtP, Value>
Where: IMsg = Incoming message
Let NMsg1 = <MtM, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc>
Where: NMsg1 = New Message-1
(Value=0) ΓPcr(NMsg1) ΓPfr (NMsg1, ΓP1)
(Value=1)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! Invalid
PID’s Info.”
(Value=2)  A text Message appears on the user interface “Access Denied! wrong
Password”
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Now, after showing the design of our proposed system using our specification language
and the abilities of both of them, in the next chapter we are going to show some case
studies done on our system using the same formal specification language that we have
proposed.
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES
4.1 Introduction
Using our Formal Specification Language, we are going to disclose three case studies;
Speed control & Highway monitoring, Remote car locating & sending a Service
request / Function message, and the last case is on Suspect car instant termination. Then
we formalize their designs, and show how they work with some scenarios then we prove
their validity and consistency.
Each case studies in this chapter can be laid out by describing it with flowcharts
and algorithms (except for the third case study), then we set up the case study devices and
their configuration using our specification language and show the scenario description on
each cases. Finally, we apply the validity and consistency tests on each case study
separately using the formal specification language that we have created.
4.2 Case study -1: Speed control & Highway monitoring
For the first case study “Speed Control & High Way Monitoring”, See Figure 4.1, we got
Figure 4.1: Case Study 1: Speed Control & High Way Monitoring
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a Highway of two sides, the one on the right is going north while the other is going the
opposite way. Each of the two ways has two lanes. The allowed speed on the right road is
60 Km/h, while 70 Km/h is the allowed speed for the left road.
On each side of the road there is a set of Equipment (Road side Equipment), those
are connected to each other and have connected to an administrative device (Coordinator
device) which has the ability to reach and access any of those Road side equipments
(RSEs), as well as the vehicles’ devices (VVD).
In this scenario, the coordinator device officer inputs the allowed speed on the
road he is responsible about as a number (in our scenario, the number should be 60 for
the right road; The right car driver is allowed to drive at the maximum of 60 Km/h, not
more than that). This will be converted into an equivalent code which will be forwarded
to the RSE devices that will propagate the code to the vehicles within its coverage area.
If the right side was driving at a higher speed more than 60 Km/h, then the
vehicle’s communication device will receive the code propagated by the RSEs. It will
convert it into an analog signal that controls the vehicle’s speed to reduce its speed and
peaks at 60 km/h not more than that.
To present this scenario mathematically, we use our formal specification language
to define each device and the connection type between them and their configuration.
Finally we show how exactly the messaging processes between the devices.
4.2.1 Participated devices definitions
In this scenario, three devices are participating in; these are; Coordination device (which
is the master of everything happening on the road it’s responsible for), Road Side
Equipment (which has forwarded and propagated the messages between the coordinator
and vehicle devices.) Vehicles VANET Devices which resides inside the vehicles, its job
is to receive the messages propagated by the RSE and translate it to take the right
required action.
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For the coordinator device, it has three contents; they are; set of functions, set of
table, and set of ports. The set of functions contain seven different functions; αMtc (checks
the type of the incoming message and decides the destiny of the carried data), αPaz
(Analyzes the incoming data stream according to the message type into usable data), αSf
(Sets some values as required), αGf (Get some values for some functions when required),
αSQL (Creates SQL syntaxes), αPcr (Creates different messages types as required), αPfr
(Forwards the messages to the required ports). A set of tables composes of 4 tables; SMT
(Speeds Mapping table), VT (lists all the vehicles instantly r within the coverage area of
the system and those were in since the last X hour(s), where X is a number (0 < X < ∞)),
SCT (Lists all the cars those were reported as suspect cars), ToR (Lists the IDs of all the
road side units under the responsibility of the coordinator device). Finally, the set of the
coordinator device ports, which has two main ports; P1 & P2. P1 (Port one, which
connects the coordinator device to the first road side unit on the highway it’s responsible
to manage). On the other side we have P2 (Port two, which connects the coordinator
device to a database server).
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Figure 4.2: Coordinator device internal architecture
Let αA = { αAF, αAT, αAP, αA_INT}
Where:




αA_INT: Co_D’s User Interface
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And let:
αAF = { αMtc, αPaz, αSf, αGf, αSQL, αPcr, αPfr}
Where:
αMtc: Message type checker function
αPaz: Packet / Massage Analyzer
αSf: set of SET functions
αGf: Set of GET Functions
αSQL: SQL syntax creator function
αPcr: Packet / Message Creator
αPfr: Packet / Message forwarder (specifies to which port)
And Let:
αAT = {αSMT[c][d], αVT[e][f], αSCT[g][h], αToR[i][j]}
Where:
αSMT[c][d]: Speed Mapping table, maps speeds as numbers into its equivalent
code. It has c of rows and d of columns, where both of c and d are
positive integers.
αVT[e][f]: Table of all the vehicles access the coverage area for the last x
hour(s). Where x is a number ( 0 < x < ∞). It has e of rows and f of
columns, where both of e and f are positive integers.
αSCT[g][h]: Contains the full information about Special vehicles table instantly
within the coverage area. It has g of rows and h of columns, where
both of g and h are positive integers.
αToR[i][j]: a Table contains the full information about the RSEs, those are under
the coordinator device responsibility. It has i of rows and j of
columns, where both of i and j are positive integers.
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αAP = {αP1, αP2}
Where:
αP1: The first port of Co_D device, connected to the first RSE.
αP2: The second port of Co_D device, connected to a database server.
Then:
αA = { αMtc, αPaz, αSf, αGf, αSQL, αPcr, αPfr, αSMT[c][d], αVT[e][f], αSCT[g][h], αToR[i][j],
αP1, αP2}
αA_Features:
αA_Mobile = False // The Co_D is not a mobile device
αA_SQL_Server = True // The Co_D has the ability to query an SQL
server directly
αA_User_Interface = True // The Co_D device can be managed by a user
interface
αA_initialize_Operations = True // The Co_D has the ability to start
messaging other devices.
αA_Info = True // Co_D can be considered as an information center, that
because it’s connected to a database server which
stores the information in its storage.
αA_Routing = True, <Routing Protocol(s) used> // Co_D has the routing
ability by using the protocols listed <Routing Protocol(s) used>.
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For the Road side Equipment (RSE), it has 4 main contents; Set of Functions, Set
of Tables, Some registers, and set of ports.
The functions set contains six different functions; βMtc (checks the type of the
incoming message and decides the destiny of the carried data), βPaz (Analyzes the
incoming data stream according to the message type into usable data), βSf (Sets some
values as required), βGf (Get some values for some functions when required), βPcr
(Creates different messages types as required), βPfr (Forwards the messages to the
required ports). The set of tables has 2 members; VT (lists all the vehicles instantly r
within the coverage area of the system and the ones were in since the last X hour(s),
where X is a number (0 < X < ∞)), SCT (Lists all the cars those were reported as suspect
cars). The set of registers has two members, these are; Speed code register (which keeps
the last speed code received from the coordinator device to propagate to the vehicles
within its coverage) and Road Side Equipment ID register (which keeps the configuration
information of the RSE), and finally, the set of the RSE ports, which has three main
ports; P1, P2, & P3. P1 (Port one, this is connected to the next RSE), P2 (Port 2, this is
the propagation port, it propagates the messages received from the coordinator device to
the vehicles, as well as, it receives messages from the vehicles to be forwarded to the
Co_D), P3 (Port 3, Connected to Co_D or to the previous RSE).
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Figure 4.3: Road side equipment internal architecture
Let βA = { βAF, βAT, βAV, βAP}
Where:
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And Let:
βAF = { βMtc, βPaz, βSf, βGf, βPcr, βPfr}
Where:
βMtc: Message type checker function
βPaz: Packet / Massage Analyzer
βSf: set of SET functions
βGf: Set of GET Functions
βPcr: Packet / Message Creator
βPfr: Packet / Message forwarder (specifies to which port)
And Let:
βAT = {βVT[e][f], βSCT[g][h]}
Where:
βVT[e][f]: Table of all the vehicles access the coverage area for the last x
hour(s). Where x is a number ( 0 < x < ∞). It has e of rows and f of
columns, where both of e and f are positive integers.
βSCT[g][h]: Contains the full information about Special vehicles table
instantly within the coverage area. It has g of rows and h of columns,
where both of g and h are positive integers.
And Let:
βAV = {βSpc, βRsq}
Where:
βSpc: A register keeps the current allowed speed to be driven at on the
road.
βRsq: A register keep the configuration of the RSE (e.g., its ID, IP, …).
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And Let:
βAP = {βP1, βP2, βP3}
Where:
βP1: The first port of an RSE device, connected to the next RSE.
βP2: The second port of an RSE device, it’s the junction point between the
vehicles and the system infrastructure.
βP3: The third port of an RSE device, connected to the previous RSE or To
the Co_D.
Then:
βA = { βMtc, βPaz, βSf, βGf, βPcr, βPfr, βVT[e][f], βSCT[g][h], βSpc, βRsq, βP1, βP2, βP3}
βA_Features:
βA_Mobile = False // An RSE is not a mobile device
βA_SQL_Server = False // The RSE does not have the ability to query an
SQL server directly, but it can reach the
database server through Co_D
βA_User_Interface = False // The RSE device does not have a user interface
to be managed by.
βA_initialize_Operations = False // The RSE does not have the ability to start
messaging other devices, it’s just a
forwarder.
βA_Info = True // The RSE can be considered as an information center, that
because it stores information of other devices. But it
doesn’t have the full information of the SQL server, RSE
stores the information for the last x hour(s), where 0 < x
< ∞.
βA_Routing = True, <Routing Protocol(s) used> // Co_D has the routing ability
by using the protocols listed
<Routing Protocol(s) used>.
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For the Vehicle’s VANET Device (VVD), it has 4 main contents; Set of
Functions, Set of Tables, Some registers, and set of ports.
The functions set contains six different functions; ΓMtc (checks the type of the
incoming message and decides the destiny of the carried data), ΓPaz (Analyzes the
incoming data stream according to the message type into usable data), ΓSf (Sets some
values as required), ΓGf (Get some values for some functions when required), ΓPcr
(Creates different messages types as required), ΓPfr (Forwards the messages to the
required ports). The set of tables has one member; RT (lists all the RSEs instantly
receiving messages from), SCT (Lists all the cars those were reported as suspect cars).
The set of registers has one member, that is; SCT_Flag (indicates this vehicles is
considered as a suspected vehicle), and finally, the set of the Vehicle’s VANET Device
ports, which has one main port; P1 (Port one, Connected to one of the RSEs or to a police
vehicle).
Figure 4.4 : Vehicle’s VANET Device (VVD)
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Let ΓB = { ΓBF, ΓBT, ΓBV, ΓBP, ΓBDAC}
Where:





ΓBDAC: VVD’s Digital to Analog Converter (attached device)
And Let:
ΓBF = {ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, Car_Ping() , Speed_Limit(SpC), Car_Stop()}
Where:
ΓMtc: Message type checker function
ΓPaz: Packet / Massage Analyzer
ΓSf: set of SET functions
ΓGf: Set of GET Functions
ΓPcr: Packet / Message Creator
ΓPfr: Packet / Message forwarder (specifies to which port)
Car_Ping():a functions can be used to spark the car to report its status
Speed_Limit(SpC): a function to limit the speed of the vehicle to the
required speed (SpC).




ΓRT[e][f]: lists all the RSEs instantly receiving messages from. It has e of
rows and f of columns, where both of e and f are positive integers.
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And Let:
ΓBV = {ΓSCT_Flag, ΓFI, ΓII }
Where:
ΓSCT_Flag: A flag register that indicates the suspicion of the vehicle.
ΓFI: A register that keeps the vehicle’s Fixed Information




ΓP1: The connection port of device ΓB, connected to the active RSE.
Then:
ΓB = {ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr , ΓPfr, Car_Ping() , Speed_Limit(SpC), Car_Stop(),
ΓRT[e][f], ΓSCT_Flag, ΓP1}
ΓB_Features:
ΓB_Mobile =True // A VVD is a mobile device
ΓB_SQL_Server = False // The VVD does not have the ability to query an
SQL server directly, but it can reach the
database server through RSE from the Co_D.
ΓB_User_Interface = True // The VVD device has a user interface to be
managed by.
ΓB_initialize_Operations = False // The VVD does not have the ability to start
messaging other devices; it’s just a
receiver and a replier.
ΓB_Info = False // The VVD can not be considered as an information center.
ΓB_Routing =False // Co_D has the routing ability by using the protocols
listed <Routing Protocol(s) used>.
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4.2.2 Communications between participating devices
- Connections between Co_D and RSE devices can be with wire, wireless or any
other communication media type. Meanwhile connection between RSE & VVD
devices should be wireless.
αA >--< βA: Wire, Wireless, or others
βA >--< ΓB: Wireless
- Connections between Co_D-To-RSE & between RSE-To-RSE devices should be
available 24 hours a day for 7 days a week.
αA >--< βA_Availibility: 24/7
βAx >--< βAx+1_Availibility: 24/7
- Connection between RSE & VVD devices can be Active or In-Active
connections.
βA >--< ΓB_RStatus: Active or Inactive
- VVD can have only one active connection with one RSE device at a time.
ΓB >--< βA_RStatus: Active
- RSE devices can communicate each other.
βA βA
- Co_D – To – RSE – To - RSE connections supposed to have IP/MAC address
filters to prevent any hacking attempts. As a result of that, we do not need for
authentication between Co_D & RSE, or between RSE and another.
ΓB >--< βA_IPFilter = True
ΓB >--< βA_MACFilter = True
αA <Ŧ> βA
βAx <Ŧ> βAx+1
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- Co_D can communicate RSE & RSE devices can communicate Co_D devices
when required:
αA βA
- So, Co_D can reach VVD devices only through RSE devices on the side of the
highway.
αA βA ΓB
- At the same time, Co_D devices have a full control on RSE & VVD devices:
αA Ξ βA , ΓA
- RSEs are connected to each other so they can reach each other:
βAx βAy
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4.2.3 Participating messages
In this scenario, four messages are needed to implement the full procedure of the
experiment, these are; MtQ (Speed Code Message), MtR (Last Destination - Speed Code
Message), MtS (Mobile node’s report), and MtT (Last Destination - Mobile node’s
report).
MtQ: αA | βAx-1, βAx, MU, <MtQ, Hp, SpC>
Where:
- MtQ – Message type Code (10001) - Speed Code Message
- MU: Multi-hop Unicast
- Hp – Hop count
- SpC – Speed Code
MtR: βA,ΓB , SB, <MtR, Rsq, SpC>
Where:
- MtR – Message Type (10010) - Last Destination - Speed Code Message
- SB: Single-hop Broadcast
- Spc – Speed Code
- RSq – RSE Sequence of which is propagating the received Speed code
message.
MtS: ΓB, βA, SU, <MtS, CR>
Where:
- Mt - Message Type (10011) - Mobile node’s report
- SU: Single-Hop Unicast
- CR – Car’s Report
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MtT: βA, αA, MU, <MtT, CR, Rsq>
Where:
- MtT - Message Type (10100) - Last Destination - Mobile node’s report
- MU: Multi-hop Unicast
- CR – Car’s Report
- RSq – RSE’s sequence Number of which the vehicle lies within its coverage
area.
On the other hand, still user of the system needs more detailed information about
the messages. Hence we need to create what is called Messages Cards, which will tell
every detail about the messages. These cards should be attached as an appendix with the
formal specification for the system we are describing, but we are going to show them
here.
1- Message type-Q Definition Card
Message Name: MtQ Message ID: M#17
Description: Speed Code Message
Packet Type: Multi-Hop-Unicast
Source: αA or βx-1 Destination: βx
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#17, Hp, SpC
Details:
 Hp – Decides how many β Device after the first β device should receive
this message.
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES 87
2- Message type-R Definition Card
3- Message type-S Definition Card
4- Message type-T Definition Card
Message Name: MtR Message ID: M#18
Description: Last Destination - Speed Code Message
Packet Type: Broadcast
Source: βA Destination: Γ
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#18, Rsq, SpC
Details:
 Rsq – Tells the Γ receiver device this is the ID for the βA device which sent
this message.
Message Name: MtS Message ID: M#19
Description: Mobile node’s report
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: Γ Destination: βA
Message length: 2 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#19, CR
Details:
 None.
Message Name: MtT Message ID: M#20
Description: Last Destination - Mobile node’s report
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βA Destination: αA
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#20, CR, Rsq
Details:
 None.
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4.2.4 Messages Flow for Case Study-1
Figure 4.5 illustrates the four messages flow between the participated devices starting by
the Co_D sends the allowed speed code out as Multi-Hop Unicast to the RSE that carries
the ID: x (RSE(x)), that message type is MtQ which will travel through all the RSE
devices between the two of them. When the RSE(x), it analyzes the MtQ message to get
the carried information (SpC - Speed Code), encapsulate the information within an MtQ
message type and propagates it to all the mobile VVDs within its coverage area.
For any VVD, when receiving an MtR message is the spark to do two major
operations; the first is applying the comparison between the current vehicle’s speed and
the incoming speed code, if the last is less than the instant vehicles speed, then it will
limits the vehicle’s speed to peak at the incoming speed. The second operation is to start
creating an instant report about the vehicle’s status at that moment, encapsulate it by an
MtS message type and unicast it to the active RSE at that moment. The RSE will unicast
the MtS message to the Co_D which will analyze & keep a copy of that vehicle’s report
in its database. See Figure 4.6 which shows the flow chart for the whole operation
starting by the Co_D sends out an MtQ message till the speed code been received by the
vehicle.
The Figure 4.6 shows more details about what is going on inside each device
when it receives a specific message, how will the message been processed by that
device’s functions, how those devices functions are making the use of the data carried by
the incoming message, and what actions will be taken as a result of the incoming
message.
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4.2.5 A Lower-Level Scenario Specification
Figure 4.6: Speed Control & High Way Monitoring – messaging algorithm
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Mtc: Message type checker
Paz: Packet analyzer
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES 91
Figure 4.6.Continue: Speed Control & High Way Monitoring – messaging algorithm
Let’s assume that we have the two highways shown before in Figure 4.1, the
allowed speed on the right side is 60Km/h, so the Co_D administrator enters, through the
Co_D interface; the allowed speed as a number, the Rsq (RSE’s ID) that specifies which
RSE the message should be started to propagate the vehicles from the opposite lane, and
the number of hops, this number tells how many RSEs after the first one should receive
the allowed speed message to propagate. See the following Scenario initial setup:
Let αA1 = Co_D1
αA1_P1_IP: 192.168.100.1/30
Let βA1 = RSE1
βA1P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: 192.168.100.3/30
P2_IP: 192.168.1.1/24
P2_DHCP: True – Full range
P3_IP: 192.168.100.2/30
VVD
Keep Rsq & it’s IP &
Sequence ID in VVD’s Cache


















Mtc: Message type checker
Paz: Packet analyzer
DAC: Digital to Analog
converter
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Figure 4.7: Case Study 1 – Scenario setup
Let βA2 = RSE2
βA2P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: 192.168.100.5/30
P2_IP: 192.168.2.1/24
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Let βA3 = RSE3
βA3P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: NULL
P2_IP: 192.168.3.1/24
P2_DHCP: True – Full range
P3_IP: 192.168.100.6/30







αGf (SPN, Rsq, Hp) <≈ αA1_Int
After the administrator enters those 3 values, they would be forwarded to the
functions of Co_D to be processed. The first value named the SpN (Speed Number) will
be mapped (by the Get_SpC function) into its equivalent code SpC (Speed Code), that
can be found in the SMT (Speed Mapping Table). In other words, Co_D would forward
the SpN to the Get_SpC of the SMT Table. The second value entered by the administrator
is the Rsq value which will be useful to get the IP address of the RSE device that Co_D
should unicast the MtQ message to, that IP can be found in ToR (Table of RSEs), and
this can be done by forwarding the Rsq to the Get_RSEIP function of the ToR Table that
will get the equivalent RSE IP.
αGf (SPc),(SPN) <≈ αA1_SMT
αGet_RSEIP (RseIP) , (Rsq) <≈ αA1_ToR
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Now the Co_D has two values; Hp, and the SpC, these will be forwarded to the
Pcr function to create an MtQ message and forward it to the Pfr function that would
encapsulate it within a packet that has the RSE IP as its destination IP, and then forward
it to Port 1 of the Co_D device.
αPcr (<MtQ>) , (Hp, SpC) αPfr ([MtQ]) , (<MtQ>, RseIPA1, P1)
Where RseIPA1: The Ip address for RSE1
αA1 ~Q> βA1
The MtQ message on the network as a data stream flow, a group of ones and
zeros, traveling from RSE to another till it reaches the destination one, there it will be
processed. When the destination RSE receives the data stream, it checks the first bits of
that data stream to check the type of the incoming message, and this is done by the Mtc
(Message Type Checker) function.
After specifying the message type, Mtc function forwards the rest of the
message’s data fields (which still as data stream only) to the Paz (Packet Analyzer)
function, this will analyze the data stream into specific data values to make the use of
them. So for the MtQ message, it will be analyzed and understood as 2 fields; Hp, and
Spc, respectively.
RSE checks the value of the incoming Hp whether it is equal to zero and not to
decide what to do with the incoming data. If Hp more than Zero, then it will propagate
the SpC within an MtR message to the vehicles through port 2, as well as, it would
forward through port one a copy of the SpC by an MtQ message it creates after
decreasing the Hp by 1. While if Hp equals to Zero, then it would not forward the SpC to
the next RSE, just keeps propagating MtR messages through port 2 to the vehicles within
its coverage area.
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βA1 <Q~ αA1
βMtc (MtQ , <_data>) , (<DATA>) βPaz (MtQ, Hp, SpC) , (MtQ, <_data>)
Where: <DATA> is the full incoming data stream
<_data> is the rest of the unanalyzed data of the incoming stream.
βPcr (<MtR>) , (Rsq , SpC) βPfr ([MtR]) , (<MtR> , P2)
βA1 ~R○ ΓB1
(Hp > 0) Pcr (<MtQ>) , (Hp-1 , SpC) Pfr ([MtQ]) , (<MtQ> , RseIPA2, P1)
Where RseIPA2: The Ip address for RSE2
βA1 ~Q> βA2
Now a vehicle receives an MtR message, it analyzes it and understands it as Rsq
& SpC fields. The Rsq tells from which RSE device the packet came, which will be kept
and the RSE’s IP in the RT (Table of RSEs). The SpC value will be sent to a Digital to
Analog converter to get the analog equivalent for it, which is SpN. SpN will be sent to
the speed controller to limit the maximum peak the car can reach. And finally as a result
or receiving the MtR message, the vehicle will start creating an instant vehicle status
report. See Figure 4.8.
ΓB1 ○R~ βA1
ΓMtc (MtR , <_data>) , (<DATA>) ΓPaz (MtR, Rsq, SpC) , (MtR, <_data>)
SQL (Rsq, RseIP) ≈> ΓB1_RT
ΓB1DAC (SpN) , (SpC)
The car’s report (CR) consists of two parts, fixed information and instant
information. The fixed information contains the device & vehicles information such as
it’s registration ID for the car, Engine ID,…etc. while the instant information has the
instantaneous status of the vehicle at the moment of the report creation.
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Figure 4.8 shows the flow chart of the operation starting from the vehicle‘s report
creation till it has been saved into the database. The report creation sparks by receiving
the MtR message by the VVD which will put both of the fixed information and the
instant status information within an MtS message type frame and unicast it to the current
active RSE connection. The IP for the destination RSE can be found in the Table of RSEs
(RT).





ΓGf (FI , II) <≈ ΓFI, ΓII
ΓPcr (<MtS>), (FI , II) ΓPfr ([MtS]), (<MtS> , P1)
// To get the IP address of the Rse currently has an active connection with the Vehicle
ΓGet_RSEIP (RseIP), (*) <≈ ΓB1_RT
Where:
*: means the active connection RSE
ΓB1 ~S> βA1
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When an RSE receives an MtS message, it would analyze message and would get
the CR to keep a copy of it in the RSE’s VT table and to insert it into an MtT message
frame and unicast it to the Co_D.
βA1 <S~ ΓB1
βMtc (MtS , <_data>) , (<DATA>) βPaz (MtS, Hp, SpC) , (MtS, <_data>)
βPcr (<MtR>) , (Rsq , SpC) βPfr ([MtR]) , (<MtR> , P2)
βPcr (<MtT>) , (CR, Rsq) βPfr ([MtT]) , (<MtT> , P3)
βA1 ~T> αA1
Finally, the Co_D receives the vehicle’s report and immediately it will create a
SQL syntax which will be forwarded to the Database server. The purpose is to keep a
copy of that CR and the RSE’s ID for that it was sent from, in the database server’s
storage.
αA1 <T~ βA1
αSQL (CR,Rsq) ≈> αA1_VT
αSQL (<SQL_Ins_Stmnt>), (CR, Rsq) αPfr ([SQL_Ins_Msg]), (<SQL_Ins_stmnt>)
Where:
SQL_Insert_stmnt: SQL statement to insert a record into a table.
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4.3 Case Study–2: Remote car locating & sending a Service request / Function
message
As for the Second case study “Remote car locating & sending a service / order message”,
See Figure 4.9, we got a Highway of two sides, the one on the right is going north while
the other is going the opposite way. Each of the two ways has two lanes.
Figure 4.9: Case Study 2: Remote car locating & sending a service / order message
On the side of each road there is a set of Equipments (Road side Equipments),
those are connected to each other and have connected to an administrative device
(Coordinator device) that has the ability to reach and access any of those Road side
equipments (RSEs) as well as the vehicles’ devices (VVD).
In this scenario, assume that someone has reported to a police station or to any
Coordinator office, that his car (The Yellow in Figure 4.9) was stolen, providing them the
details of his car (Some of the fixed information of his vehicle’s device - VVD) so they
can locate the car.
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In order to locate the car, the coordinator device officer uses some of the information
provided by the victim to find the car either by looking in the common database for the
last report received from the car or broadcast a Car_Ping message within a specific
system on a specific highway. So the car will declare about itself by reporting its status to
the coordinator device. The last solution which can be used only if the victim is sure that
his car is still on the same road (within the coverage of the system).
The first solution is the most efficient in case that the time of the accident was
unknown because the victim will not be able to know whether his vehicle still on the
same road or passed already.
After locating the car, the coordinator device officer would send a Unicast
function message to the car to stop it or just to limit its speed or do any other functions.
To present this scenario mathematically, we use our formal specification language
to define each device and the connection type between them and their configuration.
Finally we show how exactly the messaging between the devices.
4.3.1 Participated devices definitions
In this scenario, three devices are participating in; these are; Coordination device (which
is the master of everything happening on the road that it’s responsible about), Road Side
Equipment (Which is forwarding and propagating the messages between the coordinator
and vehicle devices), and Vehicles VANET Devices (these resides inside the vehicles, its
job is to receive the messages propagated by the RSE and translate it to take the right
required action). All of the three devices details, are just the same as the ones used in the
first case study.
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4.3.2 Communications between participated devices
- Connections between Co_D & RSE devices can be wire, wireless or any other
communication media type, while Connection between RSE & VVD devices
should be wireless.
αA >--< βA: Wire, Wireless, or others
βA >--< ΓB: Wireless
- Connections between Co_D-To-RSE & between RSE-To-RSE devices should be
available 24 hours a day for 7 days a week.
αA >--< βA_Availibility: 24/7
βAx >--< βAx+1_Availibility: 24/7
- Connection between RSE & VVD devices can be Active or In-Active
connections.
βA >--< ΓB_RStatus: Active or Inactive
- VVD can have only one active connection with one RSE device at a time.
ΓB >--< βA_RStatus: Active
- RSE devices can communicate each other.
βA βA
- Co_D – To – RSE – To - RSE connections supposed to have IP/MAC address
filters to prevent any hacking attempts. As a result of that, we do not need for
authentication between Co_D & RSE, or between RSE and another.
ΓB >--< βA_IPFilter = True
ΓB >--< βA_MACFilter = True
αA <Ŧ> βA
βAx <Ŧ> βAx+1
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- Co_D can communicate RSE & RSE devices can communicate Co_D devices
when required:
αA βA
- So, Co_D can reach VVD devices only through RSE devices on the side of the
highway.
αA βA ΓB
- At the same time, Co_D devices have a full control on RSE & VVD devices:
αA Ξ βA , ΓA
- RSEs are connected to each other so they can reach each other:
βAx βAy
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4.3.3 Participated messages
In this scenario, four messages are needed to implement the full procedure of the
experiment, these are; MtU (Function Message), MtV (Last Destination - Function
Message), MtW (Reply – Function Message), and MtX (Last Destination - Reply –
Function Message).
MtU: αA | βAx-1 , βAx , MU, < MtU, Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX >
Where:
- MtU – Message type Code (10101) - Function Message
- MU: Multi-hop Unicast
- Hp – Hop count
- SPN# – Only the stolen car’s Plate number
- Value:
- Value = 0 run function “Stop_Car”
- Value = 1 XXX represents the SpC.
- Value = 2 Run function “Ping_Car”
- Value = x For more functions
- XXX: see Value = 1.
MtV: βA,ΓB , SU, < MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX >
Where:
- MtV – Message type Code (10110) - Last Destination - Function Message
- SB: Single-hop Broadcast
- SPN# - Stolen car’s Plate number
- Value:
- Value = 0 run function “Stop_Car”
- Value = 1 XXX represents the SpC.
- Value = 2 Run function “Ping_Car”
- Value >= x For more functions
- XXX: see Value = 1.
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MtW: ΓB, βA, SU, < MtW, SPN#, Value >
Where:
- MtW - Message Type (10111) - Reply – Function Message
- SU: Single-Hop Unicast
- SPN# - Stolen car’s Plate number
- Value:
- Value = 0 function “Stop_Car” was done successfully
- Value = 1  Access was denied. It’s the negative answer to any
service.
- Value = 2 Positive Reply - function “Ping_Car”
- Value = x Reply for other functions
MtX: βA, αA, SU, < MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value >
Where:
- MtX - Message Type (11000) - Last Destination - Reply – Function Message
- SU: Single-hop Unicast
- Rsq – the RSE’s sequence which directly received the reply from the VVD
- SPN# - Stolen car’s Plate number
- Value:
- Value = 0 function “Stop_Car” was done successfully
- Value = 1 Access was denied.
- Value = 2 Positive Reply - function “Ping_Car”
- Value = x Reply for other functions
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For more details about the used messages in this scenario, we write the following
Messages Cards, these will tell every detail about the messages. These cards should be
attached as an appendix with the formal specification for the system we describe.
However we are going to show them here.
1- Message type-U Definition Card
2- Message type-V Definition Card
Message Name: MtU Message ID: M#22
Description: Function Message
Packet Type: Multi-Hop-Unicast
Source: αA Destination: βA
Reply: MtX
Message length: 5 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#21, Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 run function “Stop_Node”
 Value = 1 XXX represents the SpC.
 Value = 2 Run function “Ping_Node”
 Value = x For more functions
Message Name: MtV Message ID: M#23
Description: Last Destination - Function Message
Packet Type: Single-Hop Unicast
Source: βA Destination: Γ
Reply: MtW
Message length: 4 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#22, SPN#, Value, XXX
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 run function “Stop_Node”
 Value = 1 XXX represents the SpC.
 Value = 2 Run function “Ping_Node”
 Value = x For more functions
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3- Message type-W Definition Card
4- Message type-X Definition Card
Message Name: MtW Message ID: M#24
Description: Reply to MtV – Last Destination - Function Message
Packet Type: Single-Hop Unicast
Source: Γ Destination: βA
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#23, SPN#, Value
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 function “Stop_Node” was done successfully
 Value = 1 Access was denied. It’s the negative answer to any
service.
 Value = 2 Positive Reply - function “Ping_Node”
 Value = x Reply for other functions
Message Name: MtX Message ID: M#25
Description: Reply to MtU – Function Message
Packet Type: Single-Hop Unicast
Source: βA Destination: αA
Message length: 4 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#24, Rsq, SPN#, Value
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 function “Stop_Node” was done successfully
 Value = 1 Access was denied. It’s the negative answer to any
service.
 Value = 2 Positive Reply - function “Ping_Node”
 Value = x Reply for other functions
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4.3.4 The Highest-Level Message flow Specification
Let’s specify the scenario at the highest level (Black-Boxes Level).
αA1 ~U> βAx // Co_D sends a Function message to RSE that carries the ID x.
βAx ~V> ΓB1 // RSE(x) passes the Function message to the Required vehicle-1.
ΓB1⌂ βAx // Vehicle-1 Stops within the coverage area of βAx.
ΓB1 ~W> βAx // Vehicle-1 replies the status of the function implementation to the
instant active RSE.
βAx ~X> αA1 // RSE forwards the function implementation results report to
Co_D.
Till now, we expressed and showed the highest level specification for the
scenario. Now let’s show how exactly the messages are being exchanged among the
different devices and illustrate how they been analyzed inside each device.
4.3.5 Message Flow of Case Study-2
Figure 4.10 illustrates the stage after finding the location of stolen car’s from the Co_D’s
database or the common database. It shows the four messages flow between the
participated devices starting by the Co_D sends out the function message with a value of
Zero (Stop_Car) as a Multi-Hop Unicast to the RSE that carries the ID: x (RSE(x)), that
message type is MtU which will travel through all the RSE devices between the two of
them. When the RSE(x) receives an incoming message, it analyzes that message to find
its type is MtU then get the carried information (Car’s ID & Value) , encapsulates the
information within an MtV message type and unicast it to the stolen car within its
coverage area.
When the stolen car receives a MtV message with the value zero, two major
operations will be sparked; the first operation will be calling the function Stop_Car which
will reduce the car’s speed till it stops completely then the vehicle will start to create a
reply message telling whether the Car_Stop function was done successfully (Value = 0)
or not (Value = 1), encapsulates it by an MtW message type and unicast it to the active
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RSE at that moment. The RSE will unicast the MtW message contents (as MtX) to the
Co_D which will analyze the incoming MtX message and prints the reply message result
on the user interface. See Figure 4.11 which shows the flow chart for the whole operation
starting by the Co_D sends out an MtU message till the function message been received
by the vehicle. The second sparked operation is creating a vehicle report and unicast it to
the active RSE. The seconds operation can be seen in case study-1 Figure 4.8.
The Figure 4.11 shows more details about what is going on inside each device
when it receives a specific message, how will the message been processed by that
device’s functions, how those devices functions are making the use of the data carried by
the incoming message, and what actions will be taken as a result of the incoming
message.
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4.3.6 A Lower-Level Scenario Specification
Figure 4.11: Speed Control & High Way Monitoring – Messaging Algorithm
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Figure 4.11.Continue 2: Speed Control & High Way Monitoring – messaging algorithm
Let’s assume that we have the two highways shown before in Figure 4.9, the
allowed speed on the right side is 60Km/h, so the Co_D administrator enters, through the
Co_D interface; the allowed speed as a number, the Rsq (RSE’s ID) that specifies which
RSE the message should be start propagated to vehicles from, and the number of hops,
this number tells how many RSEs after the first one should receive the allowed speed
message to propagate. See the following Scenario initial setup:
RSE: Road Side Equipment
Co_D: Coordinator Device
SPN#: Incoming Vehicle Info
Rsq: RSE’s ID




Pcr (MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value)







Print on User Interface
“Function “Car_Stop”
was done successfully”
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Let αA1 = Co_D1
αA1_P1_IP: 192.168.100.1/30
Let βA1 = RSE1
βA1P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: 192.168.100.3/30
P2_IP: 192.168.1.1/24
P2_DHCP: True – Full range
P3_IP: 192.168.100.2/30
Let βA2 = RSE2
βA2P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: 192.168.100.5/30
P2_IP: 192.168.2.1/24
P2_DHCP: True – Full range
P3_IP: 192.168.100.4/30
Figure 4.12: Study Case 2 - Scenario setup
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Let RN1_Allowed_Speed: 60Km/h
Let RS1_Allowed_Speed: 70Km/h
Let βA3 = RSE3
βA3P = {P1, P2, P3}
P1_IP: NULL
P2_IP: 192.168.3.1/24
P2_DHCP: True – Full range
P3_IP: 192.168.100.6/30







The Scenario starts when a car’s owner declares to any Co_D office that his car
was stolen and provides the office with his car information such as his vehicle’s plate
number, his VVD’s serial number, …etc.
The Co_D administrator starts looking for the car in his Co_D’s native tables to
check whether the car is within his system’s coverage or not. If not, then he sends a query
to the common database asking for the current location or the last report was received
from the stolen car.
After specifying under which system coverage the stolen car is, the administrator
and the car’s owner decide to stop the car remotely. The administrator enters 4 entries
into the Co_D device through its interface:
αGf (SPN#, Rsq, Hp, value) <≈ αA1_Int
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After the administrator enters those 4 values, they will be forwarded to the
Co_D’s internal functions to be processed. The first value SPN# (Stolen car Plate
Number) can be any of the car’s information other than the plate number. The second
value entered by the administrator is the Rsq value which will be useful to get the IP
address of the RSE device that Co_D should unicast the MtU message to, that IP can be
found in the native table ToR (Table of RSEs) or in one ToR table of another Co_D
device, and this can be done by forwarding the Rsq to the Get_RSEIP function of the
ToR Table that will get the equivalent RSE IP.
In case the RSE resides within the responsibility of the same requester Co_D:
αA_Get_RSEIP (RseIP) , (Rsq) <≈ αA_ToR
While, if the RSE resides under the responsibility of a system other than the
requester’s, then we have to mention the requester’s ID and the requested from ID.
αA1_Get_RSEIP (RseIP) , (Rsq) <≈ αAx_ToR
The third input is the operation option value; this will decide what kind of
operation is requested to be done. In MtU message type, if Value = 0 then the desired
operation is to stop the car, and this what we are going to do, stop the stolen car remotely.
But if we want to limit the car’s speed only, then the administrator should use the value 1
and enter the required speed as well.
Now the Co_D has three values; Hp, SPN#, and the Operation option Value, these
would be forwarded to the Pcr function to create an MtU message and forward it to the
Pfr function that would encapsulate it within a packet that has the RSE IP as its
destination IP, and then forward it to Port 1 of the Co_D device.
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αPcr (<MtU>) , (Hp, SPN#, Value) αPfr ([MtU]) , (<MtU>, RseIPAx, P1)
Where
RseIPAx: The Ip address for RSE under which’s coverage area the stolen car is
under.
αA1 ~U> βAx
The MtU message on the network as a data stream flow, a group of ones and
zeros, with the help of the routing protocols used in the VANET network, traveling from
RSE to another till it reaches the destination one, there it will be processed. When the
destination RSE receives the data stream, it checks the first bits of that data stream to
check the type of the incoming message, and this is done by the Mtc (Message Type
Checker) function.
After specifying the message type, Mtc function forwards the rest of the
message’s data fields (which still as data stream only) to the Paz (Packet Analyzer)
function, this will analyze the data stream into specific data values to make the use of
them. So for the MtU message, it will be analyzed and understood as 4 fields; Hp, and
SPN#, Value, and XXX respectively. XXX is a value which’s type depends on the
operation option value. In our scenario, the value will be equal to zero (Stop the car) so
XXX’s value will be NULL (No need for it). But if we want to limit the car’s speed, then
the administrator needs to give the required speed, which will be represented by XXX.
RSE checks the value of the incoming Hp whether it’s equal to zero or not to
decide what to do with the incoming data. If Hp more than Zero, then it would
encapsulate the SPN# and the value within an MtV message, get’s the IP of the stolen
vehicle by mapping the SPN# into its equivalent IP (from its native VT) and starts
unicating to the stolen vehicle through port 2, as well as, it would forward through port
one a copy of the incoming MtU message after decreasing the Hp by 1 to the next RSE,
and this to make sure that the message would reach the required vehicle. While if Hp
equals to Zero, then it would not forward anything to the next RSE, just keeps unicasting
the MtV messages through port 2 to the vehicle hopping it’s still within its coverage area.
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βAx <U~ αA1
βMtc (MtU , <_data>) , (<DATA>)  βPaz (MtU, Hp, SPN#, Value, XXX) , (MtU,
<_data>)
Where: <DATA> is the full incoming data stream
<_data> is the rest of the unanalyzed data of the incoming stream.
βPcr (<MtV>) , (SPN#, Value, XXX) βPfr ([MtV]) , (<MtV> , P2)
βAx ~V> ΓB1
(Hp > 0)  Pcr (<MtU>) , (Hp-1, SPN#, Value, XXX)  Pfr ([MtU]) , (<MtU> ,
RseIPAx, P1)
Where RseIPAx: The Ip address for the RSE which has the last the report received
from the stolen vehicle
βAx ~U> βAx+1
Now a vehicle receives an MtV message, it analyzes it and understands it as
SPN#, Value, XXX fields. The vehicle’s VANET device would compare the incoming
SPN# value (carried by the MtV message) with its own (they probably the same but just
for double check), if they are equal, then it would read the rest of the incoming data and
check for the next field, The Value, if Value = 0 then it would start creating an instant
vehicle status report and send it back to the Co_D, See Figure 4.8 in case study 1, and
call the Car_Stop Function to stop the car.
In case the incoming SPN# information are not matching the vehicle’s, or the
Car_Stop function wasn’t successfully done (For some failure reason), then the vehicle’s
VANET Device would start to create a negative reply (MtW message with a Value of 1)
and send it to the current active RSE. Other wise it would send a positive reply (MtW
message with a Value of 0) to the current active RSE.
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ΓB1 <V~ βAx
ΓMtc (MtV , <_data>) , (<DATA>)  ΓPaz (MtV, SPN#, Value, XXX) , (MtV,
<_data>)
Let CSPN# = The Stolen Vehicle Information (ΓB1)
(SPN# = CSPN#)  (Value = 0)  Label: Start Car Report Creation,
Car_Stop()
(Car_Stop())  Pcr (<MtW>) , (SPN#, Value = 0)  Pfr ([MtW]) , (<MtW> ,
RseIPAx, P1)
!(Car_Stop()) Label: UNSUC
(SPN# = CSPN#) !(Value = 0) Label: Others
!(SPN# = CSPN#) Label: UNSUC
Label: UNSUC
Pcr (<MtW>) , (SPN#, Value = 1) Pfr ([MtW]) , (<MtW> , RseIPAx, P1)
// To get the IP address of the Rse which currently has an active connection with the
Vehicle:
ΓGet_RSEIP (RseIP), (*) <≈ ΓB1_RT
Where:
*: means the active connection RSE
ΓB1 ~W> βAx
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When an RSE receives an MtW message, it would analyze the message and
would encapsulate the values: Rsq, SPN#, and the operation status reply value within an
MtX message frame and unicast it to the Co_D.
βAx <W~ ΓB1
βMtc (MtW , <_data>) , (<DATA>) βPaz (MtW, SPN#, Value) , (MtW, <_data>)
βPcr (<MtX>) , (Rsq, SPN#, Value) βPfr ([MtX]) , (<MtX> , P3)
βAx ~T> αA1
Finally, the Co_D receives the unicast MtX message and analyze it its fields to
get the Operation status reply (Value). If Value equals to Zero, then it would print a
message on its user interface screen “From <SPN#>; Function ‘Car_Stop’ was done
successfully.” While if the value was equal to one, then the message that would be shown
on the user interface screen is “From <SPN#> Access was denied.”
αA1 <T~ βAx
αMtc (MtX , <_data>) , (<DATA>) αPaz (MtX, Rsq, SPN#, Value) , (MtX, <_data>)
(Value = 0) αPrint (“From <SPN#>; Function ‘Car_Stop’ was done successfully.”)
!(Value = 0) αPrint (“From <SPN#> Access was denied.”)
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4.4 Case Study – 3: Suspect car instant termination
For the third case study “Suspect car instant termination”, See Figure 4.13, we got a
Highway of two sides, the one on the right is going north while the other is going the
opposite way. Each of the two ways has two lanes.
Figure 4.13: Case Study 3: Suspect car instant termination
On the side of each road there is a set of Equipments (Road side Equipments),
those are connected to each other and have connected to an administrative device
(Coordinator device) that has the ability to reach and access any of those Road side
equipments (RSEs) as well as the vehicles’ devices (VVD).
In this scenario, assume that we have a suspected car (The Yellow in Figure 4.13),
the police want to stop that suspect vehicle peacefully by accessing the suspect’s VVD
and passes an order to stop it. The suspect’s VVD needs some credentials to be accessed
another device. That information can be gotten from the RSE instantly the suspect’s VVD
within coverage area.
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To present this scenario mathematically, we use our formal specification language
to define each device and the connection type between them and their configuration.
Finally we show how exactly the messaging between the devices.
4.4.1 Participated devices definitions
In this scenario, four devices are participating in; they are; Coordination device (which is
the master of everything happening on the road that it’s responsible about), Road Side
Equipment (Which is forwarding and propagating the messages between the coordinator
and vehicle devices), and Vehicles VANET Devices (these resides inside the vehicles, its
job is to receive the messages propagated by the RSE and translate it to take the right
required action). These were the same devices used in the last two case studies, while in
this case study we have an additional device that is called Police vehicle’s VANET
Device (which is located inside any police car and has some administration abilities).
For the first three devices details, we illustrated in the first case study. For the
Police vehicle’s VANET Device (PVD), it has 4 main contents; Set of Functions, Set of
Tables, Some registers, and set of ports. The functions set contains six different
functions; ΓMtc (checks the type of the incoming message and decides the destiny of the
carried data), ΓPaz (Analyzes the incoming data stream according to the message type into
usable data), ΓSf (Sets some values as required), ΓGf (Get some values for some functions
when required), ΓPcr (Creates different messages types as required), ΓPfr (Forwards the
messages to the required ports). The set of tables has one member; RT (lists all the RSEs
instantly receiving messages from), SCT (Lists all the cars those were reported as suspect
cars). The set of registers has one member, that is; SCT_Flag (indicates this vehicles is
considered as a suspected vehicle), and finally, the set of the Vehicle’s VANET Device
ports, which has one main port; P1 (Port one, Connected to one of the RSEs or to a police
vehicle).
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Figure 4.14 : Police vehicle’s VANET Device (PVD)
Let ΓA = { ΓAF, ΓAT, ΓAV, ΓAP, ΓADAC}
Where:





ΓADAC: PVD’s Digital to Analog Converter (attached device)
And Let:
ΓAF = { ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, Car_Ping(),Speed_Limit(SpC), Car_Stop()}
Where:
ΓMtc: Message type checker function
ΓPaz: Packet / Massage Analyzer
ΓSf: set of SET functions
ΓGf: Set of GET Functions
ΓPcr: Packet / Message Creator
ΓPfr: Packet / Message forwarder (specifies to which port)
Car_Ping():a functions can be used to spark the car to report its status
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Speed_Limit(SpC): a function to limit the speed of the vehicle to the required
speed (SpC).
Car_Stop(): a function to stop the car.
ΓAT = {ΓRT[e][f], ΓST[g][h]}
Where:
ΓRT[e][f]: lists all the RSEs instantly receiving messages from. It has e of
rows and f of columns, where both of e and f are positive integers.
ΓST[g][h]: List all the suspected cars. It has g of rows and h of columns,
where both of g and h are positive integers.
ΓAV= { ΓSCT_Flag, ΓFI, ΓII}
Where:
ΓSCT_Flag: A flag register that indicates the suspicion of the vehicle.
ΓFI: A register that keeps the vehicle’s Fixed Information
ΓII: A register that keeps the vehicle’s Instant Information
ΓAP = {ΓP1, ΓP2}
Where:
ΓP1: The first connection port of device ΓA, connected to the active RSE.
ΓP2: The second connection port of device ΓA, connects to another Γ
devices.
Then:
ΓA = { ΓMtc, ΓPaz, ΓSf, ΓGf, ΓPcr, ΓPfr, Car_Ping(),Speed_Limit(SpC), Car_Stop(),
ΓRT[e][f], ΓST[g][h], ΓSCT_Flag, ΓFI, ΓII, ΓP1, ΓP2}
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ΓA_Features:
ΓA_Mobile =True // A PVD is a mobile device
ΓA_SQL_Server = False // The PVD does not have the ability to query an
SQL server directly, but it can reach the
database server through RSE and the Co_D.
ΓA_User_Interface = True // The PVD device has a user interface to be
managed by.
ΓA_initialize_Operations =True // The PVD does not have the ability to start
messaging other devices; it’s just a
receiver and a replier.
ΓA_Info =True // The PVD can be considered as an information center.
ΓA_Routing =True // PVD has the routing ability by using the protocols
listed <Routing Protocol(s) used>.
4.4.2 Communications between participated devices
In addition to the communications illustrated in the previous case studies, we got
some more of them to explain regarding to the PVD device.
- Connection between RSE & PVD devices can be Active or In-Active connections.
βA >--< ΓA_RStatus: Active or Inactive
- PVD can have more than one active connection; one with an RSE device, and
another with any other device (In our scenario, this connection would be with a
VVD).
ΓA >--< βA_RStatus: Active
ΓA >--< X_RStatus: Active or Inactive
Where: X is any device or any layer.
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- PVD devices can have a full control on VVD devices:
ΓA Ξ ΓB
4.4.3 Participated messages
In this scenario, sixteen messages are needed to implement the full procedure of the
experiment, these are; MtA(Access Authentication Request), MtB(Reply - Access
Authentication Request), MtC(PVD info. Request From RSE), MtD(Reply – PVD info.
Request (MtC, MtF)), MtE(Copy of PVD info), MtF(PVD info. Request From Co_D),
MtG(Car SPN# info Request), MtH(Reply - Car SPN# info Request (MtG)), MtI(Car
SPN# info Request – RSE from RSE), MtJ(Reply – Car SPN# info Request (MtK, MtI)),
MtK(Car SPN# info Request from Co_D), MtL(Copy of SPN#’s info), MtM(PVD – to –
SVD Access Request & Speed information), MtN(PID availability enquiry), MtO(Reply -
PID availability enquiry), MtP(Reply - PVD–To–SVD Access Request & Speed
information).
For more details about the used messages in this scenario, we write the following
Messages Cards, these would tell every detail about the messages. These cards should be
attached as an appendix with the formal specification for the system we are describing.
But we are going to show them here.
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1- Message type-A Definition Card
2- Message type-B Definition Card
Message Name: MtB Message ID: M#02
Description: Reply to MtA – Access Authentication Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βA Destination: ΓA
Reply: None
Message length: 2 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#02, Value
Details:
Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 Access Permitted
 Value = 1 Access Denied – Wrong Password
 Value = 2 Waiting – PID’s info was not found in Special_cars_Table
(Asking Two previous β devices for the info, Sending MtC).
 Value = 3 Access Denied – Invalid PID’s info.
Message Name: MtA Message ID: M#01
Description: Access Authentication Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: ΓA Destination: βA
Reply: MtB
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#01, PID, Pswd
Details:
 Created and being sent by ΓA when it wants to access any device on β
Layer.
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3- Message type-C Definition Card
4- Message type-D Definition Card
Message Name: MtC Message ID: M#03
Description: Advanced - ΓA Information Request
Packet Type: Multi-Hop-Unicast
Source: βAx Destination: βx-1/2
Reply: MtD
Message length: 5 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#03, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x), Hp
Details:
 Created by βA Device and being sent to the two previous β devices asking
them for PID’s information in case of none existence in βA SCT table.
Message Name: MtD Message ID: M#04
Description: - Reply to MtC – PVD information Request
- Reply to MtF – PVD information Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: αA or βx-1/2 Destination: βAz
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#04, Value, PID’s info
Details:
Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 Information found, read next bits as (PID’s info)
 Value = 1 Information found, BUT Access Denied
 Value = 2 No information were found in Special_Cars_Table
 When a β device receives an MtD reply with values (MtD, 0, PID’s info),
then it would send MtB to Γ & sends a copy of the PID’s info to the next
10 β devices (MtE).
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5- Message type-E Definition Card
6- Message type-F Definition Card
Message Name: MtE Message ID: M#05
Description: Copy of PVD’s information
Packet Type: Multi-hop-Unicast
Source: βAx Destination: βx+1/10
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#05, Hp, PID’s info
Details:
 Being sparked and created when a βA device receives a positive MtD reply
holding the PID’s information. MtE would be sent to the next ten β
devices.
Message Name: MtF Message ID: M#06
Description: ΓA information Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βx-2 Destination: αA
Reply: MtD
Message length: 4 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#06, PID, Pswd, Rsq(x)
Details:
 In case of none existence of PID’s (ΓA) info in βx-1/2’s SCT table, then the
last would send an MtF request message to αA asking for those
information.
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7- Message type-G Definition Card
8- Message type-H Definition Card
Message Name: MtG Message ID: M#07
Description: Mobile Node SPN# info Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: ΓA Destination: βA
Reply: MtH
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#07, PID, SPN#
Details:
 PID requests full information for the mobile node SPN#.
Message Name: MtH Message ID: M#08
Description: Reply to MtG - mobile node SPN# info Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βA Destination: ΓA
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#08, Value, SPN#’s info
Details:
Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 Mobile node SPN# info found, read it from Mobile node SPN#’s
info field.
 Value = 1 Waiting – SPN# was not found in Vehicles_Table (asking two
previous β devices for Mobile node (Γ Device) SPN#’s info, sending MtI)
 Value = 2 Mobile node SPN#’s info invalid.
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9- Message type-I Definition Card
10- Message type-J Definition Card
Message Name: MtI Message ID: M#09
Description: Advanced - Mobile node SPN# info Request
Packet Type: Multi-Hop-Unicast
Source: βAx Destination: βx-1/2
Reply: MtJ
Message length: 5 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#10, PID, SPN#, Hp, Rsq(x)
Details:
 This message will be created by βAx in the case of none existence of the
mobile node SPN#’s information in its VT table, asking the two previous β
devices to look in their VT tables.
Message Name: MtJ Message ID: M#10
Description: - Reply to MtI – Advanced - Mobile node SPN# info Request
- Reply to MtK – Last resort - Mobile node SPN# info Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: αA or βx-1/2 Destination: βAx
Message length: 4 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#10, Value, PID, Mobile node SPN#’s info
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 Information found, read next bits as (Rsq(x), Car SPN#’s info)
 Value = 1 Waiting - No information were found in VT table
 Value = 2 SPN#’s info. Are invalid.
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11- Message type-K Definition Card
12- Message type-L Definition Card
Message Name: MtK Message ID: M#11
Description: Last resort - Mobile node SPN# info Request
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βx-2 Destination: αA
Message length: 4 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#11, PID, SPN#, Rsq(x)
Details:
 This message will be created by βx-2 in the case of none existence of the
mobile node SPN#’s information in its VT table, asking αA to look in its
own VT table & the common database storage.
Message Name: MtL Message ID: M#12
Description: Copy of SPN#’s info
Packet Type: Multi-Hop-Unicast
Source: βAx Destination: βx+1/10
Message length: 3 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#12, Hp, SPN#’s info
Details:
 None.
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13- Message type-M Definition Card
14- Message type-N Definition Card
Message Name: MtM Message ID: M#13
Description: Γ-Γ Access Request & a Service
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: ΓA Destination: ΓB
Reply: MtP
Message length: 5 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#13, PID, SPN#’s info, Opt, SPc
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Opt (Option), which is a value that decides
whether to run a specific operation or receives a speed code.
 Opt = # Any other specific services
Message Name: MtN Message ID: M#14
Description: PID (ΓA) availability enquiry
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: ΓB Destination: βA
Reply: MtO
Message length: 2 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#14, PID
Details:
 None.
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15- Message type-O Definition Card
16- Message type-P Definition Card
Message Name: MtO Message ID: M#15
Description: Reply to MtN - PID (ΓA) availability enquiry
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: βA Destination: ΓB
Message length: 2 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#15, Value
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 PID available in SCT Table
 Value = 1 PID invalid
Message Name: MtP Message ID: M#16
Description: Reply to MtM - Γ-Γ Access Request & a service
Packet Type: Unicast
Source: ΓB Destination: ΓA
Message length: 2 (Fields)
Message Fields: M#16, Value
Details:
 Its meaning depends on the Value:
 Value = 0 Operation has done successfully
 Value = 1 Access Denied – PID Invalid
 Value = 2 Access Denied – SPN#’s info doesn’t match the sent
information.
NOTE:- According to the limitation of the thesis pages number, in the next sections
we are not going to show the scenario’s lower level specification using our language.
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4.4.4 Messages Flow of Case Study-3
Figure 4.15 illustrates the whole operation when a police vehicle PVD-1 suspects the
vehicle SVD-1 and would like to stop it. PVD-1 sends a message of type A (MtA) to the
current RSE asking for the permission to access the database of that RSE to look for the
full information of that suspected car. MtA has the Police car ID (PID) and the password
(Pswd) for accessing the RSE. When the RSE receives the MtA message, it would
analyze it and check whether it carries the correct password or not, if it’s the correct
password then it would check of the PID availability in its own SCT, if a match found
there then it would reply with a positive MtB (Value = 0). Otherwise a Waiting MtB
message (Value = 2) would be issued and sent back to the PVD-1 while creating and
passing an MtC message to the two previous RSEs asking them for the PVD’s
Information. If any of them has those information, then it would send them within an
MtD message to the Original RSE that will recheck to make sure the 2 PIDs are matching
then would unicast a positive MtB to the PVD-1. But, if both of the two previous RSEs
do not have that information, then the second previous RSE would create and send a
unicast message (MtF) to the Co_D asking for that information. The reply to the MtF
message would be and MtD message unicasted to the original RSE (Rse(x)).
Now PVD-1 got authenticated into the RSE, so now it can access and query the
tables of that RSE. The police man inside PVD-1 uses the user-interface to enter the
Suspected car’s Plate Number (SPN#) and send an MtG message to the RSE to look for
the full details for that suspected car to access it and stop it.
So the RSE receives that query message and start looking for the SPN# match in
its own VT table. If a match found, then it will enclose the full information of that SPN
within an MtH message then send it back to the PVD to make the use of it. While in case
of missing the match, the RSE would try to get that information from the two previous
RSEs or from the Co_D (as the last resort) using the query messages MtI and MtK
respectively and it would get the reply within an MtJ message.
Supposedly by now, PVD-1 has the full information of SVD-1 so it can use them
to authenticate into and access the suspected car and terminates it to just limit its speed.
For our scenario purpose, the PVD-1 would stop SVD-1.
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All that will be started when the PVD-1 receives a positive MtH message that
carries the full information of the SVD-1. The police car will create an MtM message and
unicast it to the suspected car. MtM message has the required service option (in our case
study Opt = 0 which means Stop_the_car) that will not been implemented till the
authentication process takes place.
The authentication process has two stages. The first stage is done by sending a
query message (MtN) to the RSE asking for the validity of the police car that holds the
PID, the MtM message came from. If the PID was a valid, then a positive MtO reply
message would be created inside the RSE and unicasted back to SVD-1.
Here the second stage starts, a matching operation between the incoming SPN’s
information (came within the MtM message) and the SVD’s. if they are matched, then the
authentication is approved, SCT_Flag set into 1 (Which means now the SVD-1 is
officially a suspected car), Stop_Car Function been called and finally a reply message
MtP would be sent to the PVD-1 telling the result of the MtM request sent earlier.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we’ve shown three case studies with three different scenarios
using our formal specification language. Mathematically using our language, we have
described the layered system used as the VANET Environment Model and showed each
of the system’s devices architectures and its sets of operations, components, and
relations.
5.2 Case studies Differences
By looking to the three case studies in chapter Four, each of them is different from the
other, but they all were applied on the same system hardware. So we have 3 different
applications work on the same hardware.
In this section, we are going to show both of the validity and the consistency tests
on each of the three case studies. The first two case studies, their tests might look similar
but they are not, that we followed two different approaches to apply the test on.
5.2.1 Validity test
The first case study has four main steps to be done:
αA1 ~Q> βA1 …(1) // Co_D sends a Speed code message to RSE that carries the ID x.
βA1 ~R○ ΓB1 …(2) // RSE(x) passes the Speed Code message to the Required vehicle-1.
ΓB1 ~S> βA1 …(3) // Vehicle-1 replies with the vehicle’s instant status report to the instant
active RSE.
βA1 ~T> αA1 …(4) // RSE forwards the vehicle’s instant status report to Co_D.
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We can divide the whole operation into two sub-operations; propagating a speed
code, and sending a vehicle’s status report, and then we check for their validity and
consistency separately. Or we can just consider all the four steps shown above as on
operation with one conclusion because this scenario is simple. But we will illustrate the
first way.
The first two steps are under the first sub-operation; Propagating a Speed Code
(PSC) and their conclusion should be:
ΓB1○R~ βA1 …(12)
While the second two steps (3 and 4) reside under the second sub-operation;
Sending a Vehicle’s Status Report (SVSR), which’s conclusion should be:
αA1 <T~ βA1 …(34)
Table 5.1: First Scenario’s Validity Truth Table







1 F F F T F F F T -
0 F T F T F T F T -
1 T F F T T F F T -
1 T T T T T T T T T
By looking at the possibility flag column in the truth table above, the second line
is impossible to happen, so we can exclude it from the testing. The reason behind the
impossibility of the second line is because our system is a sequential system, then
Operation (1) is False which makes Operation (2) impossible to be True. All the
impossible lines would be excluded from the validity test.
There are some lines are possible to happen but can be excluded from the validity
test because they are not related to the validity proof. The first and the third lines are not
related to the validity proof because they do not satisfy the first part of the validity rule
which is saying “A set of sentences are considered Valid, if and only if there is no line in
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the system’s operation truth table having all of its statements are True while the
conclusion is False.”. So only one line left for the validity test process to check on, that is
the forth.
Assuming that all the connections and messaging were done properly with no
problems occurred then according to the validity test:
Sub-Operation Validity = !(Op.1 & Op.2 & … & Op.n & !Conclusion)
SOP validity = !((1) & (2) & !(12))
= !( T & T & !(T))
= !(F) = T
SVSR Validity = !(!(34) & (3) & (4))
= !(!(T) & T & T)
= !(F) = T
Whole System Validity = OpVa1 & OpVb1 & … & OpVn1
Whole System validity = SOP Validity & SVSR Validity
= T & T = T
Then we conclude that the system is valid with such a scenario.
For the second scenario, it has four main steps to be done:
αA1 ~U> βAx …(1) // Co_D sends a Function message to RSE that carries the ID x.
βAx ~V> ΓB1 …(2) // RSE(x) passes the Function message to the Required vehicle-1.
ΓB1 ~W> βAx …(3) // Vehicle-1 replies the status of the function implementation to the instant
active RSE.
βAx ~X> αA1 …(4) // RSE forwards the function implementation results report to Co_D.
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Because this scenario is simple, We are going to Not divide the whole operation
into two sub-operations then check their validity and consistency, as we did in case study
One. We are going to consider there are four operations and one conclusion that would
be:
ΓB1⌂ βAx …(1234) // Vehicle-1 Stops within the coverage area of βAx.
Table 5.2: Second Scenario’s Validity Truth Table
No. Possibilities (1) (2) (3) (4) (1234) Validity
1 1 F F F F F -
2 0 F F F T F -
3 0 F F T F F -
4 0 F F T T F -
5 0 F T F F F -
6 0 F T F T F -
7 0 F T T F F -
8 0 F T T T F -
9 1 T F F F F -
10 0 T F F T F -
11 0 T F T F F -
12 0 T F T T F -
13 1 T T F F F -
14 0 T T F T F -
15 1 T T T F F -
16 1 T T T T T T
By looking at the possibilities flag column in the truth table above, we can see
that only 5 lines are possible to happen, those are: 1, 9, 13, 15, & 16. So we can exclude
all the others from the validity testing.
There are some lines are possible to happen but can be excluded from the validity
test because they are not related to the validity proof. Only line 16 is related to the
validity test because it satisfies the first part of the validity rule.
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By assuming that all the connections and messaging were done properly with no
problems occurred then according to the validity test:
Operation Validity = !(Op.1 & Op.2 & … & Op.n & !Conclusion)
Operation Validity = !((1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & !(1234))
= !( T & T & T & T & !(T))
= !(F) = T
Then we conclude that the system is valid with such a scenario.
For the last scenario is a bit complex, so that we have divided it into sixteen steps:
ΓB1 ~A> βAx …(1) // Police vehicle sends an Access Authentication Request to the RSE device.
βAx ~B> ΓB1 …(2) // A reply to the message MtA
βAx ~C> βAx-1 …(3) // RSE requests the PVD information from the previous RSE
βAy ~D> βAx …(4a) // A reply from an RSE to Message MtC.
αA ~D> βAy …(4b) // A reply from a Co_D to Message MtF.
βAx ~E> βAx+1 …(5) // RSE sends a copy of the PVD information to the next RSE.
βAx-2 ~F> αA …(6) // RSE requests the PVD information from the Co_D
ΓB1 ~G> βAx …(7) // Police vehicle sends a Mobile Node information Request to the RSE.
βAx ~H> ΓB1 …(8) // A reply to message MtG
βAx ~I> βAx-1 …(9) // RSE requests the Mobile Node information from the previous RSE
βAy ~J> βAx …(10a) // A reply from an RSE to Message MtI .
αA ~J> βAx …(10b) // A reply from a Co_D to Message MtK.
βAx-2 ~K> αA …(11) // RSE requests the Mobile Node information from the Co_D
βAx ~L> βAx+1 …(12) // RSE sends a copy of the Mobile Node information to the next RSE
ΓB1 ~M> ΓA1 …(13) // A PVD sends a request to a mobile Node to Access it
ΓA1 ~N> βAx …(14) // A Mobile Node try to validate a PVD in an RSE’s Tables
βAx ~O> ΓA1 …(15) // A Reply from an RSE to a Mobile Node for the MtN request
ΓA1 ~P> ΓB1 …(16) // A Reply from a Mobile Node to a police vehicle for the MtM request
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The Black steps are compulsory while the red steps are optional. So we have
divided the whole operation into Five Sub-Operations; Op-AB, Op-CF, Op-GH, Op-IL,
& Op-MP. Each group will have a separated validity test then we do the ANDING for
their results to get the whole system’s validity test result. The conclusions for each Sub-
operation as follows:
- Conclusion for Op-AB is:
ΓB1 <B~ βAx …(12)
- Conclsion for Op-CF is:
βAx <D~ βAy …(36)
- Conclsion for Op-GH is:
ΓB1 <H~ βAx …(78)
- Conclsion for Op-IL is:
βAx+1 <L~ βAx …(912)
- Conclsion for Op-MP is:
ΓB1 <P~ ΓA1 …(1316)
The Red steps are optional with respect to the whole operation, so the system
might still be working if there is a problem appeared with any of them, but for the
validity test all of the operations, the compulsory and the optional should be valid.
Let’s assume that all the sub-operations are valid except the Op.CF was invalid
because its conclusion was False when all of its steps were done completely and flagged
as True, then we will get the following truth tables of the system:
Table 5.3: Op-AB Validity Truth Table
Possibilities (1) (2) (12)
Op-AB
Validity
1 F F F -
0 F T F -
1 T F F -
1 T T T T
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Table 5.4: Op-CF Validity Truth Table
Possibilities (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (36)
Op-CF
Validity
1 F F F F F F -
0 F F F F T F -
0 F F F T F F -
0 F F F T T F -
0 F F T F F F -
0 F F T F T F -
0 F F T T F F -
0 F F T T T F -
0 F T F F F F -
0 F T F F T F -
0 F T F T F F -
0 F T F T T F -
0 F T T F F F -
0 F T T F T F -
0 F T T T F F -
0 F T T T T T -
1 T F F F F F -
0 T F F F T F -
0 T F F T F F -
0 T F F T T F -
0 T F T F F F -
0 T F T F T F -
0 T F T T F F -
0 T F T T T F -
1 T T F F F F -
0 T T F F T F -
0 T T F T F F -
0 T T F T T F -
1 T T T F F F -
0 T T T F T F -
1 T T T T F F -
1 T T T T T F F
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Table 5.5: Op-GH Validity Truth Table
Table 5.6: Op-IL Validity Truth Table
Possibilities (9) (10a) (10b) (11) (12) (912)
Op-IL
Validity
1 F F F F F F -
0 F F F F T F -
0 F F F T F F -
0 F F F T T F -
0 F F T F F F -
0 F F T F T F -
0 F F T T F F -
0 F F T T T F -
0 F T F F F F -
0 F T F F T F -
0 F T F T F F -
0 F T F T T F -
0 F T T F F F -
0 F T T F T F -
0 F T T T F F -
0 F T T T T T -
1 T F F F F F -
0 T F F F T F -
0 T F F T F F -
0 T F F T T F -
0 T F T F F F -
0 T F T F T F -
0 T F T T F F -
0 T F T T T F -
1 T T F F F F -
0 T T F F T F -
0 T T F T F F -
0 T T F T T F -
1 T T T F F F -
0 T T T F T F -
1 T T T T F F -
Possibilities (7) (8) (78)
Op-GH
Validity
1 F F F -
0 F T F -
1 T F F -
1 T T T T
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1 T T T T T T T
Table 5.7: Op-MP Validity Truth Table
Possibilities (13) (14) (15) (16) (1316)
Op_MP
Validity
1 F F F F F -
0 F F F T F -
0 F F T F F -
0 F F T T F -
0 F T F F F -
0 F T F T F -
0 F T T F F -
0 F T T T F -
1 T F F F F -
0 T F F T F -
0 T F T F F -
0 T F T T F -
1 T T F F F -
0 T T F T F -
1 T T T F F -
1 T T T T T T
Although, four sub-operations are valid and only one optional operation is invalid,
the whole system is considered invalid according to the following equation:
Whole System Validity = Op.AB & Op.CF & Op.GH & Op.IL & Op.MP
= T & F & T & T & T
= F
When implemented, the specification language tool should show where exactly
the invalidity reason is.
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5.2.2 Consistency Test
Table 5.8 shows the truth table for the layered system working with the Speed control &
Highway monitoring scenario, the first case Study.
What we are looking for in the consistency truth table, “is there any line has
all the operations steps True and the conclusion is True as well?”, In other words,
we are looking for at least one bridge to move from the input side to the required
output side.
Table 5.8: Consistency Truth Table







1 F F F T F F F T F
0 F T F T F T F T -
1 T F F T T F F T F
1 T T T T T T T T T
The forth line satisfies the consistency rule but let’s see the following equation:
CTx = Op.1 & Op.2 & … & Op.n & Conclusion
CTPSC4 = (1) & (2) & (12)
= T & T & T = T
CTSVSR4 = (3) & (4) & (34)
= T & T & T = T
CT4 = CT PSC & CTSVSR
= T & T = T
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As long as there is at least one True Consistency Test then no need to care about
the rest of the tests, see below:
Whole system consistency = CT1 | CT2 | … | CTn
= - | - | - | T = T
Then we conclude that the system is consistent.
Table 5.9 shows the truth table for the layered system working with the second
scenario; Remote car locating & sending a Service request / Function message scenario.
Table 5.9: Consistency Truth Table
Possibilities (1) (2) (3) (4) (1234) Consistency
1 F F F F F -
0 F F F T F -
0 F F T F F -
0 F F T T F -
0 F T F F F -
0 F T F T F -
0 F T T F F -
0 F T T T F -
1 T F F F F -
0 T F F T F -
0 T F T F F -
0 T F T T F -
1 T T F F F -
0 T T F T F -
1 T T T F F -
1 T T T T T T
The forth line satisfies the consistency rule but let’s see the following equation:
CTx = Op.1 & Op.2 & … & Op.n & Conclusion
CTAll = (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (1234)
= T & T & T & T & T = T
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As long as there is at least one True Consistency Test then no need to care about
the rest of the tests, see below:
Whole system consistency = CT1 | CT2 | … | CTn
= - | T = T
Then we conclude that the system is consistent with the second scenario as well.
For the third case, there are many possibilities for the consistency to be taken care
of, that because it has compulsory and optional operations, so the consistency test should
be repeated at least twice with two different cases to make sure that the:
- First test will be applied on the system considering the compulsory operations;
Op.AB, Op.GH, and Op.MP.
- Second test we apply it on the system with considering Op.AB, Op.CF, Op.GH,
and Op.MP. The parameters we use here should make the use of Op.CF.
- Finally, we apply the test on the system with the existence of all the operations;
Op.AB, Op.CF, Op.GH, Op.IL, and Op.MP. the parameters we use here should
make the use of Op.IL.
Let’s assume that the first test was done and found the system was consistent.
While when the second test was applied, at the Op.CF a problem appeared when sending
a reply message from an RSE to another because of (For Example) wrong routing
information or incorrect message interpretation. Then we get the following truth tables:
Table 5.10: Op-AB Consistency Truth Table
Possibilities (1) (2) (12)
Op-AB
Consistency
1 F F F -
0 F T F -
1 T F F -
1 T T T T
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS & DISCUSSION 150
Table 5.11: Op-CF Consistency Truth Table
Possibilities (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (36)
Op-CF
Consistency
1 F F F F F F -
0 F F F F T F -
0 F F F T F F -
0 F F F T T F -
0 F F T F F F -
0 F F T F T F -
0 F F T T F F -
0 F F T T T F -
0 F T F F F F -
0 F T F F T F -
0 F T F T F F -
0 F T F T T F -
0 F T T F F F -
0 F T T F T F -
0 F T T T F F -
0 F T T T T T -
1 T F F F F F -
0 T F F F T F -
0 T F F T F F -
0 T F F T T F -
0 T F T F F F -
0 T F T F T F -
0 T F T T F F -
0 T F T T T F -
1 T T F F F F -
0 T T F F T F -
0 T T F T F F -
0 T T F T T F -
1 T T T F F F -
0 T T T F T F -
1 T T T T F F -
1 T F T T T F F
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Accordingly, the following operations will never come up, so the second
consistency test result will be negative. By assuming for the same reason the third
consistency test fails. According to the following rule:
Whole system consistency = CT1 | CT2 | CT3
= T | F | F
= T
The system still consistent but with a low robustness measure, one third, see
below:
Consistency Probability = (Number of Successful Tests / Total Number of the Tests) * 100 %
= (1 / 3) * 100 % = 33%
5.3 Comparative Study
Our formal specification language is written using the algebraic approach, which means,
a system can be described in terms of operations and relationships between them. See
Table 5.12 which we made to compare other specification languages into ours regarding
the Type of the language.
Table 5.12: Language Type
Language Language Type
Our SL Hybrid Systems Algebraic-Based & Scenario-Based
LOTOS Temporal-Ordering-Based
CASL First order Logic Based
CSP Process Algebra Based
Alloy First order Logic Based
Larch Sequential System Algebraic-Based
mCRL2 Process Algebra & Abstract Equational data Types Based
VDM Sequential System Model-Based
Z Notation Sequential System Model-Based
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B Sequential System Model-Based
SPIN Model-Based
OBJ Sequential System Algebraic-Based
Petri Nets Concurrent System Model-Based
Our language is a formal specification language written to specify precisely
VANET Systems and applications. But it can specify other types of Networks such as
Infrastructures Networks, Mobile Networks, and Sensors Networks. Table 5.13 shows a
comparison between the different specification languages application areas.
Table 5.13: Application Area
Language Application Area
Our SL VANET & Networked systems
LOTOS Protocol Specification
CASL General Purpose
CSP Interaction of Concurrent System
Alloy Software Systems Expressing
Larch Computing Systems
mCRL2 Concurrent Discrete Event Systems Description
RSL Grid-Resource Discovery
RAISE Software Development
VDM Computer-Based Systems Development
Z Notation Computing Systems Modeling and Describing
B Development of Computer Software
SPIN distributed software systems
OBJ Computer Software Systems
Petri Nets Discrete Distributed Systems
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As we have mentioned before, our formal specification language is written to
specify precisely VANET Systems and applications. According to our survey and
literature review no other formal specification was created to specify VANET aspects. So
if we would like to compare other Specification languages to our language regarding the
covered VANET aspects, then ours provides a set of notations and rules those cover some
additional aspects (VANET related), these aspects are: (See Table 5.14.)
 Device Ability - DA
 Device Movement - DM
 Messages exchangeability - ME
 Device Internal Behavior logic - IB
 Security - Sc
 Validity Test - VT
 Consistency Test - CT
 Design and Configuration – D&C
 VANET Environment Description - ED
 Connections Description - CD
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Table 5.14: Covered aspects Comparison, √: Completely Covered, P√: Partially Covered
Language DA DM ME IB Sc VT CT D&C ED CD
Our SL √ √ √ √ P√ √ √ √ √ √
LOTOS √ √ √ √ √ P√
CASL √ √ √ √
CSP √ √ √ √ √ P√
Alloy √ √ √ √
Larch √ √ √ √ P√
mCRL2 √ √ √ √ √ √
RSL √ √ √
RAISE √ √ √
VDM √ √ √ √
Z √ √ √ √ P√
B √ √ √ √ √
SPIN √ √ √ √ √
OBJ √ √ P√
Petri Nets √ √ √ √
The last point we would like to mention, but not the least, formal specification
languages have a limitation that they are not well suited to deal with the user interaction,
while our language plan is to create an answer file for each user interface. That file has all
the answering information required from the user to enter. This file should be filled by
the researcher who is using our language and should be changed according to the scenario
purpose.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter some final remarks on the comparison results in chapter Five. To begin,
section 6.2 describes the results of the project. In addition, section 6.3 gives some
directions for future research into the area of vehicular Ad-hoc Networks.
6.2 Conclusion
We started this project aiming to accomplish three Objectives; those are Creating a
formal specification language precisely for VANET systems, creating a layered model for
VANET systems, and outlining an application layer protocol for Service delivery to
remote nodes. In chapter 3 we have explained in details the creation of our specification
language and defined all the notations and the rules of the language. Then we described
the layered system using our specification language and illustrated the protocol abilities
through showing its messages abilities.
If we get back to Table 5.13 we would find that our language is the only one
among the rest in the table, covers the application area of VANET systems. Our formal
specification language, mainly we have created it to specify and proof the validity and
verification of the VANET systems and their applications. VANET compares to other
network types, has special needs such as high mobility, High level of security, and High
bandwidth, so it needs a special language that can describe all those different aspects. The
aspects covered by our language are VANET specific but at the same time it can be used
to describe some other network types such as Infrastructures networks, Mobile nodes
Networks, and Sensors Networks.
VANET has the two types of systems; Sequential and Concurrent Systems as
well, so that, in Table 5.12 we can see our specification language was described as a
Hybrid Systems specification language. On the same table, we showed that our language
is Algebraic-Based & Scenario-Based because it was written according to the Algebraic
approach and can be used based on Scenarios.
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Our specification language covers many of the VANET aspects; those were not
covered all by any other specification language as we can see in Table 5.14.
6.3 Future Work
Many further works can be added to the specification language or to the layered system
model or to its application layer protocol.
6.3.1 Tool Development
A tool for our language is needed to be developed so other researchers who work on
VANET systems and applications development can use to present their work and
simulate it and prove its validity and consistency.
We have created the language notations set, rules set, and two proofing tests.
What needed is a GUI tool supported with a text editor that provides the ability to print
our language symbols and interprets them. Our language uses many Non-ASCII
notations. The GUI tool’s text editor should provide the ability to print those notations.
6.3.2 Language Enhancement
As we mentioned before, our specification language precisely specify VANET systems
and their applications and it covers many aspects of the VANET area but no all of them.
For example, the security aspect is a very important requirement in VANET systems
because if a successful hacking attack could happen on any VANET system, it might lead
to a disaster, so that we always need a robust security system besides the VANET system.
Some more notations are needed in the security aspect to cover.
Our language provides two kinds of tests, Validity test & Consistency test, the
first is to tell whether or not a system is available for a specific application or not and the
opposite way. The consistency test tells how reliable a system is with some scenarios or
an application or the other way back. Many other tests or algorithms can be added to the
current language to make it more efficient to deal with faults and errors trying to refine
the system by auto-fix them or just to show where and what the error is and gives some
suggestions on how to fix that error.
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6.3.3 Application layer protocol enhancement
The motivation for lining out the application layer protocol was to draw a starter line for
creating a common protocol can be used on VANET environment and to push researchers
to create more applications based on this protocol. So more works can be done to enhance
and develop the protocol, such as, creating more multi-purpose messages, those can be
used by different applications for different purposes.
6.3.4 Developing a simulator for VANET systems
Using our layered system model combined with the specifications language notations
(instead of using programming language) we can create a model based simulator engine
for VANET systems. There would be icons refer to different layers devices, a user can
click and drag the icon of a device and put it on the simulator’s design board, when
double click the device icon, its built-in functions would appear and the user can create
more functions for that device using our language notations.
The simulator would have an extension to design printable VANET systems
figures. This extension would offer many views of the system. The lower level we show,
the more details of the system would be shown.
6.3.5 Developing more of VANET applications
Based on our application layer protocol and the VANET environment model, many
applications can be inspired from and be developed. For example, a punishment fine
delivery system that will provide kind of mailing system between the central police
station of a city and the vehicles within that city.
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